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I  come  to  international  economic  law  as  an  outsider,  as  an American
public  international lawyer interested  in the constitutional  structure of the
international  legal  order. I come  with all  the fascinations  and  prejudices
public  law  scholars  bring  to  the  traditions  of  international  private  law,
commercial  arbitration,  international  finance,  trade.  Nevertheless,  my
sense  is  that  modem  internationalists,  both  public  and  private,  share  a
pragmatic  sensibility  or style,  at once down  to  earth  or case by  case and
technocratically  sophisticated.  I  come  to  international  economic  law to
explore  this  sensibility,  its  attitudes  towards  internationalization,  its
thoughts  about politics  and  the  role of international  law.
At the same  time, for all  their  similarities,  the traditions  and  intellec-
tual  styles  of  public  international  law  and  international  economic  law
remain  estranged,  caught  in  an  elaborate  pas-de-deux  of public  and  pri-
vate,  metropolitan  and  cosmopolitan  sensibilities.  In  this  piece,  I  focus
on  the  voice  of  one  international  economic  law  intellectual,  Professor
John Jackson of the University  of Michigan  Law  School,  as  exemplified
in  his  short  1989  treatise  on  international  economic  law,  The  World
Trading System: Law and Policy of International  Economic Relations. I
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am  interested  in Jackson's  relations  with  the  discipline  of public  interna-
tional  law,  and  in  the  distinctive  style of  international  policy  science  he
develops-both  its  promise  and  its  peril.
John  Jackson's  book  on  trade  law'  ranks  with  the  best  contemporary
international  policy  scholarship,  as  the  words  on  the  cover  indicate,  at
once  an  "introduction,"  a "treatise,"  and  a "reference."  A classic  work in
the  field  of  international  economic  law  by  perhaps  its  leading  North
American  academic  practitioner,  the  book  exemplifies  the  ideas  and
practices  which  make  contemporary  international  economic  law  a distinc-
tive  genre.  Fifty  years  after  Kelsen's  lectures,  the  book  expresses  the
wisdom  of  the  post-war  international  economic  order,  poised  for  the
challenges  of the  next century.
A  senior  law  professor  at  the  University  of  Michigan,  Jackson  pre-
sides  over  the  field  of  trade  law  in  the  United  States.  Indeed,  it  was
Jackson  who  largely  invented  the  field,  transforming  his  experiences
with  the  United  States  Trade  Representative's  office  from  a  narrowing
regulatory  specialty  into  a  recognized  subject  of  legal  study.  In  many
ways,  we  can  see Jackson's  as a classic  academic project-founding  and
developing  a  field  or school.  He  began  by  getting  trade  law  recognized
as  a significant field  of study for American  lawyers.  In The  World Trad-
ing System,  he goes  further,  claiming,  quite  modestly  and  tentatively,  to
represent  what  he  terms  "international  economic  law."'  Seen  this  way,  it
1. JOHN  H.  JACKSON,  THE  WORLD  TRADING  SYSTEM:  LAW  AND  POLICY  OF
INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIc  RELATIONS  (1989).
2.  Writing  in  1948,  Georg  Schwarzenberger  makes  "the  case  for  recognizing  a
special  branch  of  law"  addressing  international  economic  relations.  Georg
Schwarzenberger,  The  Provence  and  Standards of  International Economic  Law,  2
INT'L  L.Q.  402,  405  (1948).  In  the  familiar  mode  of  a  social  science  funding  propos-
al,  Schwarzenberger  juxtaposes  the  bewildering  array  of  world  events  with  a  scholarly
inattention  that  demands  remedy.  Schwarzenberger  opened  his  article  with  an  an-
nouncement:
International  economic  relations  are  front  page  news.  The  Marshall  Plan,  de-
valuation  of  the  French  franc,  Geneva  and  Havana  Trade  Conferences,  Anglo-
Russian  trade  relations,  the  Andes  Trade  and  International  Wheat  Agreements,
inter-Allied  discussions  on  German  currency,  foreign  assets  in  Austria,  national-
ization  of  British  and  American  owned  property  in  Eastern  and  South  Eastern
Europe  and  proposals  for  a  Western  Customs  Union  are  but  a  few  items  select-
ed  at  random.  Each  of  these  problems  has  its  intricate  legal  aspects,  and  they
all  are  within  the  province  of  public  international  law.  It  may  not  be  inappro-
priate,  therefore,  to  inquire  whether  the  science  and  practice  of  international  law
are  properly  equipped  to  deal  with  this  host  of topical  issues.
The  answer  to  this  question  can  hardly  be  an  unqualified  affirma-
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is not difficult to imagine his  strategy,  both  institutionally  and  intellectu-
ally.
At  the  institutional  level,  he  developed  his  teaching  materials  into  a
casebook 3  and  taught  numerous  students  who  would  follow  him  into
law  teaching.  He has  participated  in the  conference  scene  for American
law  professors,  presiding  and  speaking  at  numerous  panels  on  trade  law
which place  him  between  the world  of trade  practice  and the  academy.
Although  experienced  in  American  government,  he  has  been  careful  to
distance  himself from  the positions of the United  States Trade Represen-
tative, acting  as  a  sort of pragmatic  conscience  for  liberal  trade,  without
becoming  identified  with  any one  issue or policy dispute.
Academically,  his  project  faced  a  number of  obstacles.  When  he be-
gan,  none  of the  options  available  to  students  interested  in  the business
or commercial  side of  international  law-what  might  be  called  "private
international  law"  outside the United States-could  easily be  imitated by
trade  law.  There  were  advanced  "international"  offerings  in  recognized
areas  of domestic  law,  international  tax  being  the  most well  developed.
Trade  was  far too  specialized  a  regulatory  subject,  however,  to  be rou-
tinely  offered  as  part  of  the  domestic  law  curriculum.  Jackson's  main
competitors  were  general  courses  in  transnational  law  or  international
business  transactions.4  Each  represented  itself  as  a  broad  subject,  ad-
dressing structural  and  institutional  issues beyond  the details of particular
tive  ....
Id. at  402.  Schwarzenberger  continued:
A  glance  at the  textbooks  of the  inter-war  period  and  at the  syllabuses  in
international  law  of  the  law  schools  of  the  leading  universities  all  over  the
world  will  indicate  how  the  challenge  was  met.  It  is  probably  no  exaggeration
to  say  that  it  was  done  largely  by  ignoring  the  problem  ....
It  would  seem  that  the  time  has  come  for  the  establishment  of separate
branches  of international  law,  supplementing  treatises  on,  and  teaching  in,  the
general  principles  of international  law.  Such  specialization  will  not  only  result
in  providing  more  adequate  knowledge  in  the  narrower  fields,  but  is  likely  to
enrich  insight  into  the  nature,  functions  and  principles  of  the  law  of nations  as
such  ....
Id. at  403-04.
Eighteen  years  later,  Schwarzenberger  would  cover  the  same  ground  more  compre-
hensively  and  more  confidently.  See  Schwarzenberger,  supra.
3.  JOHN  H. JACKSON  &  WILLIAM  J.  DAVEi,  LEGAL  PROBLEMS  OF  INTERNATION-
AL  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS:  CASES,  MATERIALS  AND  TEx-r  (2d  ed.  1986).
4.  Cf.  ALAN  C.  SWAN  &  JOHN  F.  MURPHY,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON  THE
REGULATION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  BUSINESS  AND  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  (1991)  (interna-
tional-business-transactions  approach).
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transactions  and  deals.  There  was  a  good  deal  of overlap,  transnational
law  focusing  slightly  more  on  courts  and  regulatory  conflicts,  interna-
tional  business  transactions  more  on international  contracts,  property,  and
business  regulation.  Both  dealt  primarily  with  American  law,  and  both
self-consciously  straddled  a  number  of  domestic  law  fields  bearing  on
international  transactions.  When  Jackson  began,  an  American  law  school
with  limited  room  in  the  curriculum  for international  "specialty"  courses
would  almost  certainly  have  offered  (faculty  resources  being  equal)  any
of these  courses  before  international  trade.
The  achilles  heel  of the  operation  was  limited  attention  to  both  for-
eign  law  and  the  public  international  law  structure.  Neither transnational
law  nor  international  business  transactions  gave  much  attention  to  inter-
national  public  law  rules,  other  than  those  covering  expropriation  and
various  quixotic  efforts  to  monitor multinational  companies.  Where  trea-
ties  or executive  agreements  were relevant,  both  were  more  interested  in
the  American  reception  of  international  rules  than  in  their  international
generation  or  foreign  applicability.  All  of  these  courses  had  begun  as
efforts  to  render  the  American  legal  curriculum  less  parochial,  but  each
had  drifted  back  to  domestic  law  at  the  highest  point  of  the  American
century  under the  pressure  of student  interest, the perceived  influence  of
American  law  internationally,  and  the  perceived  poverty,  even  irrele-
vance,  of the  public  international  law  and  comparative  law  fields  in  the
same years.
Jackson's  success  was  to  exploit  these  weaknesses  without  invoking
either comparative  law  or public  international  law.  Comparative  law  had
marginalized  itself by  stressing  either a  deep  foreign  expertise  incapable
of being  generalized,  or a savvy  knowledge  of how business  is  conduct-
ed  in  a  particular  region  unlikely  to  be  seen  as  part  of  the  basic  cur-
riculum.  Public  international  law  had  reacted  to  the  wide  American
perception  of  its  irrelevance  to  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy  by  pro-
liferating specializations  (law  of the  sea,  human  rights,  etc.)  and  becom-
ing  itself immersed  in  American  public  law  by  focusing  on  the  foreign
relations  law of the  United  States.
In  the  GATT, Jackson  had  an  international  institutional  apparatus  and
regulatory  machinery  which  was  relatively  unknown,  and  which  was
linked to  an  American  statutory  regime.  Public  international  law  teachers
generally  avoided  the  economic  institutions,  except  to  comment  on  their
constitutional  structure  or voting  procedures,  unless  they  were  interested
in  development  issues,  in  which  case  they  would  likely  focus  on  the
International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank,  rather  than  the
GATT.
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Jackson's  academic  achievement  was  to displace international  business
transactions  and  the  tradition  of transnationalism  by  capturing  the intel-
lectual energy  and  hope for international  public  law  and  the felt necessi-
ty of dealing  with  the "foreign"  without  losing  the basic  American  legal
materials and  the national  private  law  order.  By focusing  largely  on  the
reciprocal  interaction  of  national  governmental  and  legislative  institu-
tions,  he  imagined  an  international  "trade  constitution"  which  brought
international  trade  into  the  domestic  public  order  to  revitalize  it  as  an
international  system.
At  the  same  time,  he recast  clashes  between  national  regimes  not  as
political  disputes  awaiting  international  regulatory  harmonization  nor  as
deeply  estranged  cultural  differences  to be  compared,  but  as  an  imper-
fect "interface"  mechanism  through which different  legal cultures  related
to  one  another. He  was  consequently  able  to develop  a broad  theory  of
international  economic  relations  from  the  details  of  trade  law  which
would  seem  liberal,  pluralistic,  and  internationalist  by  contrast  to  the
tradition  of transnationalism,  while  seeming  pragmatic  and  realist  about
commercial  matters  when  contrasted  with  public  international  law.  In
short,  he made  international  trade  a "regime"  you  could  study,  like  the
European  Economic  Community,  as  a  working  example  of international
regulation.
As  a result,  we  can  anticipate  the  distance  travelled  from  the  tradi-
tions  of  postwar  public  international  law.  The  discipline  of  trade  and
economic  law  has  displaced public  international  law,  and  management  of
economic  relations  has replaced  the  problems  of peace  and  war. Tradi-
tionally,  we  read  the  move  to  international  economic  law  as  the  dis-
placement  of one  discipline by  another-from  public  law  to private law,
from  a  concern  with  national  sovereignty  to  an  international  order  re-
moved  from sovereign  forms,  from  law  to policy,  and  from  adjudication
to  administration,  with  economics  replacing  politics  as  law's  sidekick
and  nemesis.
At the same  time,  however,  we  sense  a  move  away  from,  or perhaps
beyond,  these  sorts  of  distinctions.  As  this  familiar  story  goes,  interna-
tional  law  was  preoccupied  with  the  distinctions  between  public  and
private, law  and politics,  diplomacy  and  trade,  international  and  national.
For  contemporary  international  economic  law,  these  distinctions  have
been  relaxed,  or set  aside. The  contemporary  international  policy  scien-
tist--however  much  he  prefers  the  economic  to  the  legal,  the legal  to
the political,  the private  to  the public,  the  international  to  the national,
and  so  forth-is  fully  at ease  with  a  relaxed  and  ad  hoc  mixture  of all
these  elements.  In  this,  the  world  of Jackson  seems  not  simply  a  dif-
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ferent  or  parallel  discipline,  but  seems  also  more  up  to  date  and  more
sophisticated  than  that of his public  international  law  predecessors.
I.  PREFACE  AND  INTRODUCTION:  THE NEW DISCIPLINE
OF INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  LAW
Above  all,  Jackson's  book  offers  a  succinct,  readable  description  of
the  various  elements  which  have  come  to  comprise  international  eco-
nomic  law.  Of  the  fourteen  chapters  (308  pages),  only  the  introduction
and  conclusion  seem  at all  theoretical  or speculative  (a  total of thirty-six
pages).  Even  here  the  voice  is  pragmatic,  ushering  us  into  an  existing
"trading  system."  Gone  is  the  pubic  international  lawyer's  elaborate
speculation  on  the  existence  and  nature  of international  law.  The  intro-
duction  is  entitled  "The  Policies  and  Realities  of International  Economic
Regulation."5
Jackson  speaks  directly  of  international  law  only  in  the  penultimate
section  of this  first chapter, after  introducing  liberal  trade  theory  and  the
science  of  policy  in  international  economic  affairs  which  will  be  the
main  background  and  subject  for  the  book.  The  section,  labeled  "Inter-
national  Law  and  International  Economic  Relations:  An  Introduction, '
gives  us  some  important  clues  about  the relationship  between  Jackson's
project  and  that  of public  international  law.  The  section  has  three  parts:
"International  Economic  Law,"7  "International  Law  and  Economic  Rela-
tions,"8  and  "Functional  Approach  to  International  Law."9  Jackson  takes
up  international  law  just  after  introducing  the  term  international eco-
nomic law to  name  the  discipline  to be  covered  in  his book,  by  way  of
contrast.  He  opens:  "By  way  of  introduction  to  the  international  law
bearing  on  economic  affairs,  and  as part  of an  historical  introduction  to
it,  several  observations  may  be  useful  to  the  reader."'"  International  law
will  be  history,  background.
He  introduces  us  to  the  basic  "sources"  of international  law,  treaties
and  custom,  but  notes  that  "[u]nfortunately,  customary  international  law
norms  are  very  often  ambiguous  and  controverted.""  Indeed,  often
5. JACKSON,  supra  note  1,  at  1.
6.  Id.  at  21.
7.  Id.
8.  Id.  at  22.
9.  Id.  at  23.
10.  Id.  at  22.
11.  Id.
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"scholars  and  practitioners  disagree  not  only  about  their  meaning  but
even  about  their existence."'2  As  it turns out, in  economic  affairs,
there  is  very  little in  the way  of substantive international  law customary
norms  (that is, norms  other  than  ones  dealing  with  procedures  for  govern-
ment-to-government  relations,  or  of relations  among  firms  or  individuals
in  the few  cases  when  international  law  is deemed  to  apply  to  firms or
individuals).
3
As  a result,  the  reader  can  readily  ignore  the  elaborate speculations  of
the  international  law  field,  concerning  himself  only  with  the  relatively
straightforward  world  of treaties.
Here,  Jackson  introduces  his  "functional  approach."" '  People,  he  tells
us,  particularly  "the  public,"  sometimes  question  the  importance  and
effectiveness  of international  law,  and  Jackson  acknowledges  that  this is
not surprising,  given  how  often  these  rules  are  violated."  But,  he  sug-
gests,  this  is less  true when  "reciprocity  and  a desire to  depend  on other
nations'  observance  of rules"  leads  "nations  to  observe  rules  even  when
they  don't  want  to."'"  This  seems  particularly  the  case  "in  the  context
of  economic  behavior"  where  rules  have  important  "operational  func-
tions,"  providing  "predictability  or  stability"  without  which  "trade  or
investment  flows  might be even more  risky."'7
Broadly speaking, these paragraphs  offer  an unexceptional  introduction
to  the  sorts  of arguments  international  lawyers  make  for the efficacy  of
their  discipline  in  the  pragmatic  age.  For  the  international  lawyer,  the
only  surprising  elements  are  Jackson's  suggestion  that there  are  few  in-
ternational  law  rules  of  relevance  to  economic  affairs  (dismissing  the
broad range of contemporary  international  law  sources  and procedures  in
favor of  treaties),  and  his  further  suggestion  that  those  which  do  exist
are  perhaps  particularly  likely  to  be  followed  for  reasons  of economic
self-interest.
Public  international  lawyers  have  developed  what  they  term  a  "func-
tional"  approach  in ways  precisely  counter  to Jackson's  first  suggestion.
Rather  than  emphasizing  the  narrow  range  of  substantive  rules  about
which  one  might  be  skeptical,  they  have  celebrated  the  importance  of
sources  and  procedural  rules  in  establishing  a  regime  of  international
12.  Id.
13.  Id. at  23.
14.  Id.
15.  Id.
16.  Id.
17.  Id. at  24.
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public  order, even  in  the  absence  of agreement  on  particular  substantive
norms.  It is  to  the  project  of elaborating  substantive  rules-whether  ex-
tending  the  list  of human  rights  or  articulating  more  precise  standards
for  air traffic  safety-that  international  lawyers  have  been  beckoned  by
polemics  for  two  generations.  Jackson  seems  simply  to  be  setting  this
procedural  regime  and  this project  of international  public  order aside-to
be  replaced  by  a  network  of  market  relations  for  which  only  a  few
substantive  rules  will be  necessary.
Jackson  rather  weakly  defends  the  second  proposition  by reference  to
the  traditional  arguments  for  free  trade  which he  has  earlier  introduced:
"If such  'liberal  trade'  goals  (for reasons  discussed  in  section  1.2)  con-
tribute  to  world  welfare,  then  it  follows  that  rules  which  assist  such
goals  should  also  contribute  to  world  welfare."'"  At  this  point,
Jackson's  argument  goes  off in  two  quite  different  directions.
If we  follow  his  parentheses  and  return  to  section  1.2,  we  find  a
lengthy  discussion  of  "liberal  trade"  policy  and  the  theory  of  compara-
tive  advantage. 9  Jackson  is  extremely  modest  about  the  conclusions
which  can  be  drawn  from  economic  theory,  even  though  he  has  warned
us  that  "the  basic  economic  propositions  of  international  trade  poli-
cy  . . . will  lie  at  the  center  of this  exposition."' 2  Although  the  "theory
does  have  strong  intuitive  appeal,"'  Jackson  is  careful  to  summarize
major  criticisms  and  point  out  obvious  weaknesses.  Jackson  notes  that
"[o]f  course,  this  basic  'economic  goal'  is  not  the  only  goal  of interna-
tional  trade  policy,"'  an  assertion  he  discusses  in  a  subsection  entitled
"Competing  Policy  Goals  and  Noneconomic  Objectives."' 23
Liberal  trade  theory  is  defended  only  as  a  fact.  Thus,  for  example,
"regardless  of  their  validity  or  intellectual  persuasiveness,  there  is  no
question  that  [economic  arguments  for  liberal  trade]  . . . have  been
influential.  The  basic  'liberal  trade'  philosophy  is  constantly  reiterated
by government  and private  persons,  even  in the  context  of a justification
for  departing  from  it!"24  He  continues:  "[T]here  can  be  little  doubt  of
the  general  policy  underpinnings  of  the  post-World  War  II  international
economic  system  . . . ."'  As  a  result,  Jackson  does  not  need,  among
18.  Id.
19.  See  id. at  8-17.
20.  Id.  at  6.
21.  Id.  at  13.
22.  Id. at  9.
23.  See  id. at  17-21.
24.  Id.  at  8.
25.  Id. at  9.
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his  qualifications,  to  introduce  the  reader  to  any  conflicts  or  counter-
arguments  within economics;  they  have  been  netted  out  by  consensus.
Economic  theory,  now  a possible  justification  for international  law,  is  a
matter  of observation.  He  does  not  claim  that  economics  tells  us  that
some international  law  rules  will be followed,  only  that some  legal rules
will be part of a liberal  trade system.
Jackson  is  not a "law  and economics"  scholar  in any  traditional  sense.
He  does  not  follow  the  entailments  of specific  arguments  of economic
theory for particular rules, nor assess  aspects of legal culture  in econom-
ic terms.  Economics  plays a much more  general  role  in the  text. Jackson
deploys  economic  theory much  as  public international  lawyers  deploy  re-
flections  about  the  way  "nations  behave,"  or  anthropological  notions
about  how  societies  develop-to  establish  a  factual  baseline,  even  if a
mythical  one,  for his  international  regime  and  momentum  for his policy
proposals.  He  validates  in  a  general  way  those  rules  and  those  aspects
of the overall  public  international  law  system  which  seem,  for whatever
theoretical  or fanciful  reasons,  necessary  or desirable  to  promote  trade
and  advance,  in  Jackson's  definition  of  "liberal  trade,"  "the  goal  to
minimize  the  amount  of interference  of governments  in  trade  flows  that
cross  national  borders."27  Where  international  law  is  useful  to  that end,
it too has  become simply a matter of fact--clear, orderly, without  signif-
icant internal  contradiction  or bias,  a  significant  part of  the  policy  con-
text.
If  we  continue  reading,  rather  than  following  the  parentheses,  we
come  to what seems  a  more direct discussion  of the relevance  of law, a
rather  confused meditation  on  the  relationship  between  theory  and  prac-
tice  suggested  by  Maitland's  phrase  "the  'seamless  web'  of  the  law."'2
Jackson  reminds  us  that despite  the  importance  of "coming  face  to  face
with  the  complexity  and  coarseness  of reality  with  the  aim  of  solving
real  problems  there  is  always  the  risk  of losing  sight of  the forest  be-
cause  one's  gaze  focuses  on  particular  trees."  Anecdotes  can  be  as
misleading  as  theories.  "Thus  we  see  the  dilemma  of  a  book  like
this."
30
26.  See,  e.g.,  LOUIS  HENKIN,  HOW  NATIONS  BEHAVE:  LAW  AND  FOREIGN  POLICY
(2d  ed.  1979).
27.  JACKSON,  supra note  1, at  8.
28.  Id. at  24  (quoting  F.W.  Maitland,  A  Prologue to  a History of English Law,
14  LAW  Q.  REv.  13,  13  (1898)).
29.  Id.
30.  Id. at  25.
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In  response,  Jackson  will  offer  "a  little  of both."'"  The  book  will  be
neither  deductive  nor  inductive,  but  will  "state  issues  or  questions...
without  in  all  cases  trying  to  formulate  answers." ' 3  The  result  is  a
number  of  "themes  or  problems,"  widely  divergent  in  type,  including
"[t]he  dilemma  of  rule  versus  discretion,"  the  "'effectiveness'  of  the
trade  rules,"  the  need  to  relate  conflicting  policy  goals,  some  of  which
"have  to  do  with  the  legal  and  constitutional  structure  of  the  'system,"'
and  so  forth.33  The  result  of  this  direct  theoretical  excursion  into  the
seamless  web  of  the  law  is  a  dispersion  of  dilemmas  in  the  face  of
which  one  can  only  be  modest.  Jackson  concludes  the  introduction  on a
typical  note:  "Thus  I  have  expressed  a  sort  of  'consumer  warning.'
Don't expect  too much  of this  book."' 34
Jackson has  differentiated  his new  discipline  from  public  international
law  in  two  steps.  First he  treats  those  rules  which  seem,  either  actually
or hypothetically,  to serve a  liberal trade  system  (i.e.,  those  which  either
reduce  barriers  to  trade  or  enhance  security  and  predictability).  Such
rules  should  properly  be  a focus  of study  for the  international  economic
lawyer.  Jackson  suggests  no  difficulty,  at  this  level,  in  figuring  out
which  rules  those  are.  Where,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  difficulties
and  confusions,  we  have  the  enduring  dilemmas  of  policy-dilemmas
less  to  be  solved  than,  in  Jackson's  terminology,  managed.  The  rest  of
public  international  law-its  system  of  procedural  order,  its  theoretical
arguments  for  itself, its polemics  for personal  commitment-has  been  set
aside,  promoted,  or demoted.  For the  international  economic  system,  this
international  law  seems  relevant  only  as  introductory  background,  as
history,  or  as  theory.
Unlike  the  powerful  argument  for  international  law  among  nations
made  by  public  international  lawyers,  Jackson  makes  the  argument  for
international  economic  law  softly,  less  rejecting  international  law  and
setting  up  a  parallel  discipline,  a  preferable  optic,  than  describing  inter-
national  law's  general  displacement  and  restricted  arena  of  continued
relevance.  Indeed,  when  Jackson  speaks  about  these  matters,  he  stresses
the law's entanglement  with  economic  policy.  The book's  preface  opens
this  way:  "Trade  law  and  policy  involves  a  remarkably  intricate  inter-
play  of international  law,  national  law,  and  nonlaw  disciplines,  including
31.  Id.
32.  Id.
33.  Id.
34.  Id. at  26.
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economics  and  political  science."' 35
He  introduces  the  new  discipline  of  international  economic  law  as
something  to  which  "one  has  heard  references"  in "recent  years,"  stress-
ing  that  "[u]nfortunately,  this  phrase  is  not  well  defined," 6  and  has
been  used  so  vaguely  that  it  might  refer  to  "almost  all  international
law."37  He  suggests,  but does  not embrace,  a  "more  restrained"  defini-
tion,  involving  only  those  matters  relevant  to  cross-border
transactions.'  In the  end,  he takes  his  cue  from  fact  rather  than  theory:
"In  any  event, the subject  of international  trade,  whether  in goods  or in
services  (or  both),  is  clearly  at  the  core  of  international  economic
law."39 His book  will build from  the rules  which  concern  this core.
The key points  here  are Jackson's  transformation  of theoretical  prop-
ositions  into  factual  observations,  his  dismissal  of  international  law's
classic  concerns  as  matters  of theory,  and  his  correlative  modesty  about
the alternative  he advances.  In one sense,  this  is simply  the work of one
realist  displacing  another.  Jackson,  like  Kelsen,  wants  to  move  things
from  theoretical  concerns  to  practical  realities.  Jackson's  greater  infor-
mality,  shorter  theoretical  prolegomena,  etc.,  simply  mark  th  progress
from  public  international  law.  In  another  sense,  however,  Jackson  has
changed  roads  altogether,  for  now  the  driving  image  is  not  a  public
order of sovereigns,  but a market  of economic  actors.
Jackson  characterizes  the  introduction  and  the  three  chapters  which
follow  as  concerned  with  "the  institutional  and  legal  structure  of  the
world  trade  system."  The  next  seven  chapters  take  up  "the  most  im-
portant"  of  the  "substantive  regulatory  policies  of  that  system."'  His
final  chapter  offers  "conclusions  and  perspectives."  Beyond  the  appar-
ent  logic  of  this  division-a  general  policy  framework  followed  by
specific  policies--the  three  structural  chapters  develop  the  theoretical
argument  sketched  in  the  introduction,  illustrating  both  the  similarity  of
Jackson's  pragmatism  as  well  as  the  differences  he  establishes  between
the old discipline  of international  law  and  the  new international  econom-
ic  law.  The  later  substantive  chapters  suggest  the  geographic  and  con-
ceptual  contours  of  the  international  economic  law  regime  Jackson
35.  Id. at  ix.
36.  Id. at  21.
37.  Id.
38.  Id.
39.  Id.
40.  Id. at  115.
41.  Id.
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presents.
II.  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  CHAPTERS:  PHASES  IN  THE
DEVELOPMENT  OF THE PRAGMATIST  VOICE  AND
POLEMIC-NEW  RELATIONS  AMONG  SOME
FAMILIAR  DISTINCTIONS
Like  other  modem  pragmatists,  Jackson  is  deeply  skeptical,  even
rudely  dismissive,  of  the  traditional  distinctions  (international/national,
economic/legal,  law/politics)  which  might  be  thought  necessary  for  "in-
ternational  economic  law"  to  have  an autonomous  coherence.  Like many,
however,  Jackson  finds  such  distinctions  easier  to  disparage  than  to
eliminate.
The  three  chapters  which  follow  the  introduction,  presenting  the  "in-
stitutional  and  legal  structure"  for  trade,  both  dismiss  and  reinstantiate
these  distinctions.  They  are  not,  of course,  organized  directly  to  make  a
theoretical  argument  of this  sort. Rather,  their  titles suggest  a descriptive
and  logical  general  structure:
The  International  Institutions  of Trade:  The  GATI 3
National  Institutions"
Rule Implementation  and  Dispute  Resolution4 5
Still,  after  reading  the  introduction,  the  reader  might  be  forgiven  for
finding  the  list  somewhat  puzzling.  For  one  thing,  in  the  first  chapter
Jackson  is adamant  that  "national"  and  "international"  dimensions  of the
trade  system  neither could  nor should  be  distinguished:
An  even less  fortunate  distinction  of subject matter  is often  made between
international  and  domestic  rules.  This  book  will  not  indulge  in  that  sepa-
ration.  In  fact,  domestic  and  international  rules  and  legal  institutions  of
economic  affairs  are  inextricably  intertwined.  It  is  not  possible  to  under-
stand  the  real  operation  of either  of these  sets  of rules  in  isolation  from
the  other.'
He  adds  that  "[t]he  tendency  for  academic  subject  matters  to  separate
international  from  national  or  domestic  issues  becomes  an  important
source  of misunderstanding."47
At  the  same  time,  the last of these  chapters,  concerning  dispute  reso-
43.  Id. ch.  2.
44.  Id. ch.  3.
45.  Id. ch.  4.
46.  Id.  at  22.
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lution  and  rule  implementation,  although  surely  general,  is  surprisingly
legal  in  its focus.  Indeed,  the problem  of "compliance"  with  intenation-
al  normse  and  the  importance  of  dispute resolution  mechanisms  in  the
process  of  rule  implementation  has  become  a  central  preoccupation  of
the public  international  law field.  In a  habit which  follows  the tradition-
al interest  in  the establishment  of  an  international  court,  dispute  resolu-
tion  and  compliance  are  selected  for  special  treatment  in  international
law  texts not because they are particularly  germane  or well developed  in
given  substantive  areas,  but  because,  as  primitive  and  decentralized
judiciary  substitutes,  they  seem  to  provide  the  most  practical  arena  for
investigating  the efficacy  of  international  law  as  a  whole.  By  contrast,
Jackson had  introduced  law  almost apologetically  in  the introduction:
Thus  the  purpose  of  this  book  is  to  examine  the  theory  and  real  imple-
mentation  of the policies of international  trade  in our  contemporary  world
in  a way  that attempts  to  explain  how  the  theories  have  been  effectively
constrained  by  the  processes  of  real  human  institutions,  especially  legal
institutions.  The  perspective  of this  book  is  that  of  a  legal  scholar,  of
course.  (My "comparative  advantage"  would  not realistically  support  any
other  perspective.)  Yet my goal-not too  ambitious,  I hope--is to  explore
the  multidisciplinary  context  of  trade-policy  rules  ....  I  will  state  the
basic  economic propositions of international  trade policy,  and they  will lie
at the center  of this  exposition.
Given  Jackson's  insistence  that  problems  of  "policy,"  oriented  around
specific  dilemmas  or  "themes"  of  practical  relevance,  are  central  to  his
conception  of  international  economic  law,  it  is  surprising  to  find  the
traditional  preoccupation  of public  law  regime  builders  so  central  to  his
discussion  of  the  "'constitutional  structure'  of  the  contemporary  world
trade  system."' 5  The  deployment  of dismissed  distinctions  is,  of course,
familiar in  contemporary  legal  pragmatism. The  difficulty  is to  determine
precisely  how  and  where,  and  with  what  strategy,  the  two  attitudes  are
deployed.
Jackson's  second  chapter  introduces  the  "international  institutions  of
trade"  by focusing  on  the  GAIT.  It  reads  like  a  disquisition  on  what
may  and  may  not  be  considered  either  "law"  or  a  "legal  institution,"
even  as  the  descriptive  focus  on  the  GATT  makes  law  and  questions
about  what  might  count  as  "legal"  seem  both  theoretical  and  histori-
48.  See  id. at 7.
49.  Id. at 6.
50.  Id. at  7.
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cal.5  The  chapter  responds,  in  a  diffuse  way,  to  an  opening  paradox:
"Although  the GATT  is  featured  in  headlines  of major daily  newspapers
as  the  most  important  treaty  governing  international  trade  relations,  the
fact  is  that  the  GAT"  treaty  as  such has  never  come  into  force."' 52  We
might  dismiss  this  as  the  sort  of professional  trivia  or historical  detail
that  experts  and  insiders  are  supposed  to  know.  Indeed,  Jackson  "must
hasten  to  clarify,  however,  that  the  obligations  of  GATT  are  clearly
binding  under  international  law,"' 53  but  the  "no-it-isn't/yes-it-is"  theme
continues  throughout  the  chapter.
Indeed,  we  get almost  no  substantive  information  about  the  GAIT'  in
the chapter  on  the  international  trade  system. That  is  postponed  for later
more  particular  chapters.  This  general  treatment  focuses  on  the  broad
framework  which  holds  those  substantive  practices  together,  much  like
the  typical  public  international  treatise  which  begins  with  procedural
matters,  and  then  covers  particular  substantive  topics  as  illustrations.  At
first  glance,  however,  Jackson's  general  structure  seems  far  less  ad-
vanced,  in  part  because  he  eschews  discussion  of  international  law's
procedural  elements  as  irrelevant  to  a  system  structured  by  a  market
rather than  by  inter-governmental  accommodation.  As  a result,  he  seems
preoccupied  with  the  legality  of  the  structure-precisely  the  issue  mod-
em international  lawyers  are  most  obsessive about  forgetting.
Jackson  tells  us  that  the  international  trade  regime  is  a  complex  edi-
fice  of institutions  and  treaties,  of which  the  GATr  is  the  most  impor-
tant.54  Yet,  he  goes  on,  the  GATT  is  not  really  an  institution  and  not
really  a  binding  treaty,  partly  as  a  result  of  historical  oversight  and
error.  The  GATT,  Jackson  maintains,  had  "flawed  constitutional  begin-
nings."' 55  Still,  Jackson  continues,  "any  fair  definition"  would  deem
GATr  an  "international  organization."' 5  Although  in  theory  "not  an
'organization"'  and  therefore  without  "members," ' 57  the  GAIT  has  con-
tracting  parties,  and  we  can  list  nations  which  participate  in  GAIT
obligations."  These  contracting  parties  can  act  jointly,  often  by  majori-
ty  vote.59  Jackson  concludes  that  it  is  actually  better  to  think  of  the
51.  Id. at  27.
52.  Id.
53.  Id.
54.  See  id. at  27-29.
55.  Id. at  30.
56.  Id. at  38.
57.  Id. at  45.
58.  Id. at  45-46.
59.  Id. at  48.
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GATT  as  an  "elaborate  group  of  committees,  working  parties,  panels,
and other bodies."
If we look  at legal  norms,  Jackson  maintains,  the GATr's  many  and
varied  bilateral  commitments  and  tariff  concessions  are  the  key  legal
obligations;  beyond  that  there  is  simply  a  "code  of  conduct."'  This
code of conduct,  however,  does have  several  key  obligations.  Of course,
these  vary  a  great  deal  in  application"  and  are  often  not  complied
with.'  There  is  now  also  a  great deal  of bilateral  breach  brought  about
by  the  so-called  "voluntary  export  restraints."'  In  any  event,  he  contin-
ues,  the  official  sphere  of  application  of the  GATIT  code  is  rather  lim-
ited.  It  applies  only  to  products  and  is  binding  only  on  governments.0
It does, however, greatly  influence  other sectors  and  actors  as well.  Still,
it  is  riddled  with  exceptions-grandfather  clauses,  waivers,  balance-of-
payments  exceptions,  and  many  more.Y  There  are  also  many  loopholes
and  sectoral  exemptions  for  products,  including  agriculture  and  tex-
tiles.67  The  point, Jackson  tells  us,  is  that  the  GATT  is  "complex,  con-
stantly  changing,  and  furnishes  both  pitfalls  and  opportunities  for con-
structive  diplomacy."
Like  many  public  international  lawyers,  Jackson  sets  aside  issues  of
law's  specificity.  He  does  so,  however,  neither  in  recognition  of  the
reality  of  national  behavior  and  the  existence  of  a  sophisticated  proce-
dural  regime,  nor  out  of  any  personal  peace-orientation  or  optimistic
desire  to  view  the  glass  half-full.  Jackson  relaxes  the  sharp  distinction
between  the  legal  and  the nonlegal  in  his  appreciation  for the  apparent
maturity or flexibility  of an  international  system  not preoccupied  with  its
own binding  force.  He does  so  because  it  seems  that the  existing  inter-
national  trade system,  in  this  way  the most sophisticated  of international
regimes,  is  itself a  m6lange  of  law  and  non-law,  institutions  and  non-
institutions-a  scattered  array  of  obligations  and  sites  for  bilateral  or
multilateral  engagement.  Thus,  for  example,  in  looking  at  the last  com-
pleted round  of GATT negotiations,  Jackson  concludes  that  the  "overall
impact of  these results  was  to  substantially  broaden  the scope  of cover-
60.  See  id.
61.  See  id. at  41.
62.  Id.
63.  See  id.
64.  See  id.
65.  Id. at  42.
66.  See id. at  42-43.
67.  Id. at  44-45.
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age  of  the  GATT  system"  despite  the  fact  that  "[t]he  legal  status  of
these  various  agreements  and  understandings  . is  not always  clear."
At  other times, however,  Jackson  quite firmly  defends  law's  specifici-
ty,  often  at  precisely  the  moment  he  is  most relaxed  about  the  distinc-
tion  between  national  and  international.  It  is  as  if, for Jackson,  the  end
of  one  distinction  requires  the reinstatement  of  the  other.  This  relation-
ship  is  most  apparent  in  Jackson's  notion  of  the  world's  increasing
"interdependence,"7  introduced  as a  factual  observation  at the  very  start
of  the  book:  "[T]he  world  has  become  increasingly  interdependent."'
He  notes  that  trade  "constitutes  over  50  percent  of  the  gross  national
product  of  some  countries,"  and  is  significant  even  for  countries  (like
the  United  States)  with  large  internal  markets.'  Nevertheless,  interde-
pendence  is  not  primarily  a  matter  of  statistics.  It  is  rather  a  matter  of
interlocking  political  fears.  "[G]overnment  leaders,  businessmen,  and
almost  anyone  else  feels  some  anxiety  about  those  mysterious  foreign
influences  that  can  affect  daily  lives  so  dramatically."'3  Interdependence
is  significant  because  with  it "has  come  vulnerability."' 74
National  economies  do  not  stand  alone:  economic  forces  move  rapidly
across  borders  to  influence  other  societies  ....
...  Economic  interdependence  creates  great  difficulties  for  national
governments.  National  political  leaders  find  it  harder  to  deliver  programs
to  respond  to  needs  of constituents.  Businesses  fail  or flail  in  the  face  of
greater  uncertainties.  Some  laboring  citizens  cannot  understand  why  it  is
harder  to  achieve  the  standard  of living  to  which  they  aspire."
This  interdependence  has  been  achieved  over  the  past  forty  years  in
part  through  the  effort  of international  institutions,  and  in  part  through
technological  advances.  It has  created  a  world  for international  econom-
ics,  whose  task,  "today  . . . is  largely  a  problem of  'managing'  interde-
pendence."' 76  What  is  to  be  managed?  The  "host  of  new  problems"
brought  about  by  the  fact  that  "[w]hen  economic  transactions  so  easily
cross  national  borders,  tensions  occur  merely  because  of the  differences
69.  Id. at  55.
70.  Id.  at  2.
71.  Id. at  3.
72.  Id. at  2.
73.  Id.
74.  Id. at  3.
75.  Id.
76.  Id. at  4.
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between  economic  institutions  as  well  as  cultures."  Management,  for
the  international  economic  law  specialist,  means  addressing  anxieties
about  the  foreign  and  bridging  cultural  differences  in  a  key  distinctly
different  from  that  of national  politics.  Because  of interdependence,  na-
tional  governments  on  their own  simply  become  "frustrated"  addressing
these  new  problems.8
Nevertheless,  governments  "respond"  in  many  ways.'  Some  of these
responses  are  legitimate  policy  options  examined  later  in  the  book:
"creat[ing]  an international  regulatory  system,"  and "develop[ing]  internal
policies  designed  to  enable  their  nations  to  better  cope  with  the  chal-
lenges  of  the  world  economy"  which  Jackson  terms  "industrial  poli-
cies."'  When  responding  in  these  ways,  governments  "confront  interna-
tional  as  well  as  national  sets  of  rules,  procedures,  and  princi-
ples"8 "-the very  same  rules  that  were  called  forth  by  the  imperatives
of an  expanding  international  market's  need  for  security,  predictability,
and  the like.
Sometimes,  however, governments  are  tempted  to disregard  these rules
or  to  interpret  them  cynically,  exploiting  the  "ease  with  which  detailed
legal  criteria  can  be  overcome  for  political  purposes." '  This  behavior
typifies  a
larger  dilemma...  today:  the  tension  that  is  created  when  legal  rules,
designed  to bring  the subject  a  measure  of predictability  and  stability,  are
juxtaposed  with  the  intense human  needs  of government  to  make  "excep-
tions"  to  solve  short-term  or ad hoc  problems.  This  tension poses  difficult
problems  for the  practitioner and  the scholar.
In  short,  when  the  issue  is  government's  political  resistance  to  the
interpenetration  of national  and  international,  scholars  and  practitioners
stand with  the rules.  When  the issue  is residual  attachment  to the partic-
ularity  of  law,  the  practitioner/scholar  stands  with  the  international,
where  those sorts  of distinctions  no  longer seem  relevant.
Where  Jackson's  consideration  of  international  trade  law  and  institu-
tions  is  preoccupied  with  displacing  law's  specificity,  his  treatment  of
national  institutions  in  the  following  chapter  is  closely  focused  on  the
77.  Id.
78.  Id. at  5.
79.  Id.
80.  Id.
81.  Id.
82.  Id. at 6.
83.  Id.
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relationship  between  international  and  national.  In  a  sense,  Jackson  pur-
sues  the  theme  of  his  introduction,  elaborating  on  the  centrality  of  na-
tional  institutions  to  the  international  trade  system.  He  reasserts  their
importance84  and  introduces  a  number  of  significant  national  institu-
tions,  beginning  with  the United  States presidency  and  Congress.  Indeed,
the  chapter  is  significant  in  part  because  we  can  begin  to  see  the  out-
lines  of  the  international  trade  regime's  physical  geography:  Jackson
devotes  sixteen  pages  to  the  United  States,  three  and  one-half  pages  to
the European  Community,  and  one-half page  to  Japan.
More significant,  however,  is  the role  and  nature  of the  national insti-
tutions  Jackson  outlines.  The  chapter  opens  with  a  short  disquisition  on
the nature of sovereignty:
The erosion  of the  concept  of sovereignty  in  international  affairs  has been
much  commented  on.  Perhaps  in  no  context  more  than  international  eco-
nomic affairs  has  this erosion  actually  occurred.'
What  Jackson  describes  is  a  matter  of fact:  sovereignty  has  been  "erod-
ed,"  itself an  interesting  physical  metaphor.  The point  is  at once  familiar
and  puzzling.  For  a  public  international  lawyer,  such  an  observation
might well  be  followed  by an  analysis  of the  importance  of international
norms  and  institutions,  the  history  of  their  triumph,  and  a  polemic  for
their  development.  This  is  precisely  the  sort of history  Jackson  gives us
in  introducing  the  erosion  of  law's  specificity  in  the  preceding  chapter.
Here,  by  contrast,  Jackson  uses  sovereignty's  erosion  to  introduce  the
importance  of national  institutions.
He  dismisses  the  possibility  that  sovereignty  might  still  be  used  to
"argue  against  either  international  rules  or foreign  government  demands
for consultation  or representation,  on  the basis  that  it  'interferes  with  our
sovereignty,'  or  that  it  encroaches  on  the  'internal  affairs'  of  a  given
government."'86  Given  interdependence,  this  "is  usually  a  misplaced  ar-
gument  in  today's  world."" 7  At  the  same  time,  however,  no  "proposed
course  of  international  action"  is  possible  except  through  the  "le-
84.  Id.  at  59  ("It  is  also  clear  today  that  any  coordinated  activity  of  govern-
ments,  especially  in connection  with  economic  affairs,  requires  a  complex  set of  indi-
vidual  governmental  actions  by  both  international  and  national  institutions.").
85.  Id.  Interestingly,  Jackson  cites  only  Wolfgang  Friedmann's,  The  Changing
Structure of International Law-the  1964  high  water  mark  of  post-war  liberalism  in
American  public  international  law,  and  square  in  the  tradition  of  Kelsen's  Holmes
Lectures-for  this  proposition.
86.  JACKSON,  supra  note  1, at  6.
87.  Id.
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gallconstitutional/political  constraints"  imposed  by  national  "proce-
dures."  In  Jackson's  world,  the  international  has  become  substantive:
The  national  provides  procedures  for implementation.
The  national  works  best  as  a  mopping-up  operation,  attuned  to  the
needs  and rules of the international  regime,  and  deploying  its  institutions
in  that  context.  But  Jackson  uses  the  section  he  labels  "United  States
Law  and  the  International  System-Synergy  or  Conflict"'  to  make  a
broader point. It is  not simply  that,  for example,  "to  achieve  any  mean-
ingful  initiative...  the  GATT  requires  not  only  action  by  some  body
of that organization,  but also action by  at least the United  States and the
European  Community-and  probably  also  by Japan,  Canada  and  certain
other key  countries."
The  erosion  of sovereignty  has  also  eliminated  both  the necessity  and
the possibility of  dealing  with  the  United  States  or the European  Com-
munity  as  units  in  favor  of  a  dispersed  set  of  institutions  and  actors,
both  within  and  without  the  government9  Indeed,  the  most  significant
lesson of Jackson's  chapter on national  institutions  is not that the nation-
al  should  be  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  international  trade  regime,  but
that  a  manager  of  the  international  trade  regime,  wherever  he  or  she
works, internationally  or nationally,  must harness  a wide variety  of inter-
national,  domestic,  and  foreign  entities  to  get  anything  done?  Jackson
goes  on  to  present  the  significant  institutional  players  and  statutory  re-
gimes  in the United  States,  the  European  Community,  and Japan.
Between this and  the preceding  chapters,  we can  see two  quite differ-
ent roles for national  actors:  one, handmaiden  to the  trade regime (facili-
tator,  translator,  implementer);  the  other,  an  autonomous  actor,  resisting
the  international.  The  first  role,  leading  to  synergy,  is  preferable,  not
because  it will  promote  free  trade,  but  because  it  reflects  a  more  accu-
rate  understanding  of  the  facts  of  contemporary  international
life-interdependence  brings  with  it  a  fragmented  sovereign  with  many
players,  which  the  sophisticated  policy  manager  will  understand  as  nu-
merous  opportunities  for engagement.  This  is  a national  unit  to  be  wel-
comed into  the international  trade regime:  indeed,  we should  insist  upon
88.  Id. at  60.
89.  Id.
90.  Id. at  59-60.
91.  Id. at  77-78.
92.  See,  for  example,  Jackson's  treatment  of  United  States  courts.  executive,  and
Congress  and  the  European  Community's  "departure"  from  theories  of  "strict  sover-
eignty"  in  following  up  the  implementation  of  the  Tokyo  Round  agreements  in  the
United  States,  id. at  197-99.
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it,  refusing  theoretical  separations  of  the  national  and  international.  The
point  of Jackson's  meditation  on  sovereignty  is  to  set  the  "facts"  of
interdependence  against  the  assertion  of  national  autonomy  where  it
might  threaten  the  international  trade regime.
At  the same  time,  there  is  another  type  of national  behavior  in  which
the nation  fancies itself autonomous,  unitary, and  sovereign,  and  operates
out  of  theory  rather  than  practice.  This  outmoded  role  for  the  nation-
al-familiar  from  the  introduction  as  the  illegitimate  attempt  to  swamp
law  with  politics-relies  on  the  sort  of  autonomy  for  national  institu-
tions,  the  sort  of distinction  between  national  and  international,  which
Jackson  will  not "indulge."93
Thus,  in  considering  the  implementation  of  international  economic
law,  Jackson  divides  "opposition"  to  the  effectiveness  of  international
rules  into  two  categories,  both  rooted  in  national  governments.  Some
opposition  "can  be  traced  to  . . .older  concepts  of national  sovereign-
ty,' 94 which  translates,  for  Jackson,  into  illegitimate  self-dealing  by  na-
tional leaders:
The  chance  to  go  "tooting  off in  private  jets  to  negotiate  with  other  na-
tional  leaders  at  comfortable  locations  or  three-star  restaurants"  is  a  key
plum  of  otherwise  dull  government  jobs,  a  high  government  ex-official
once  indicated.95
But  the  "wise"  national  leader  should  also  advocate  breach  of  interna-
tional  economic  law  obligations  when  the  rule  is  "bad  policy"  or "out-
dated"  or  "when  reform  of the  rule  is  badly  needed."' 96  In  short,  when
the national  leader is  the more  appropriate  agent  for  implementation  of a
sound  international  economic  policy.
We  can  begin  to  see here  the  complex  geography  of Jackson's  inter-
national  economic  law.  It  is  not  simply  radiation  out  from  the  United
States  toward Europe  and Japan,  but  involves activities  on two  conceptu-
al  levels  pursuing  incompatible  logics:  a  trade  regime,  associated  with
the  international  and  with  law,  but agnostic  about  their specificity;  and  a
lower  level,  associated  with  national  institutions  and  politics  when  these
cannot  be  recruited  into  "synergy"  with  the  international  economic  re-
gime  and  insist  on  making  old-fashioned  arguments  about "sovereignty."
In  the  well-functioning  trade  regime,  there  is  no particular  role for clear-
93.  Id. at  22.
94.  Id.  at  84.
95.  Id.
96.  Id.  at  84-85.
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ly  legal  or international  institutions.  In  an  interdependent  world,  a  vari-
ety  of social  forms  and  institutions  can,  as  a matter  of fact,  be  used  in
managing  commercial  transactions.  Law  regains  its  specificity  when
necessary  to  counterbalance  national  sovereign  recidivism,  cabining  the
tendency  of governments  to stray  from  the range  of acceptable  responses
to the new  interdependence.
For Jackson,  an "interdependent"  sovereignty  involves  a  tension,  pre-
sented  as such,  between the use or deployment of state  institutions  as  an
instance  in  international  economic  regulation  or  management,  and  re-
moving  the state  as  a political  instance  altogether.  The tension  could  be
resolved,  of course,  and  conflict  could  give  way to  synergy,  if those  in-
volved  in  the national  systems  would  change  their orientation  from  an
outmoded  political  nationalism  to  a  broad,  more  sophisticated  manage-
ment  ethic.  They  should  be  moved  to  do  so,  Jackson  suggests,  for  a
familiar  reason:  that  is  the  direction  in  which  history  is moving.
Jackson's  chapter on dispute resolution,  which  follows  the chapters  on
international  and  national  institutions,  takes  up  the  effectiveness  of  the
international  economic  law  system  in  classic  terms.  Jackson  quotes  a
lengthy  passage  "adapted  from"  two  previous  articles  of  his  written  in
the  metropolitan  tradition  of  legal  process  and  transnationalism.  We
find  again  the opposition  between  a "'power-oriented'  technique"  and a
"'rule-oriented'  technique."  Every  "observable"  international  system
involves  "some  mixture  of  both,"  and  both  involve  action  by  national
as well  as  international  actors,  public  as well  as  private  negotiations.  In
the rule-oriented  approach,  however,  all  actors  can participate  democrati-
cally,  having  "their  inputs"  at  various  levels,  and  all  can  rely  on  "sta-
bility  and  predictability."'"  The  power-oriented  technique,  by  contrast,
requires  secrecy  and  executive  discretion,  hallmarks  of  a  unitary  and
undemocratic  sovereignty.  In  the  power-oriented  technique,  players'
"bargaining  chips"  are  perceptions  of relative  authority  rather  than  rule
interpretations,  and  the  stronger  will  be  at  an  advantage.  In  the  rule-
oriented  technique,  raw  power differentials  are  not  crucial.  Rather,  they
97.  Id. at  85-88  (adapting  text  from  John  H.  Jackson,  Crumbling Institutions of
the  Liberal  Trade System,  12  J.  WORLD  TRADE  L.  93,  98-101  (1978)  [hereinafter
Jackson,  Crumbling Institutions]; John  H.  Jackson,  Governmental Disputes in  Interna-
tional Trade Relations: A  Proposal in  the Context of GAIT,  13  J.  WORLD  TRADE L
1, 3-4  (1979)  [hereinafter  Jackson,  Governmental Disputes]).
98.  Id. at  85.
99.  Id. at  85-86.
100.  Id.  at  87-88  (quoting  Jackson,  Crumbling  Institutions. supra  note  97, at
98-101;  Jackson,  Governmental Disputes, supra note  97,  at  3-4).
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are  tempered  by good  faith,  and  by  the  fairness  of the rules  themselves.
The  crucial  point is  again  historical:
To  a large  degree,  the  history  of civilization  may  be described  as  a grad-
ual  evolution  from  a  power-oriented  approach,  in  the  state  of  nature,
toward  a  rule-oriented  approach  ....
[A]  particularly  strong  argument  exists  for pursuing  gradually  and
consistently  the  progress  of international  economic  affairs  toward  a  rule-
oriented  approach.''
This  historical  narrative,  bracketed  in  lengthy  quotations  from  earlier
works,  sits  uneasily  with  Jackson's  usual  take-it-as-it-comes  posture  of
management  realism.  This  chapter  ends  "looking  at  the  future"  of  dis-
pute  settlement  and  advocating  work  to  improve  the  international  dispute
settlement  system  for  economic  matters."  In  this  sense,  the  chapter  is
more  aggressively  situated  in  the  development  of  the  legal  system  than
the  book  as  a  whole,  and  certainly  more  so  than  the  conclusion.  Here,
Jackson  advocates  attention  to  the  system,  rather  than  resolution  of any
particular  dispute:  "[I]t  must  be  recognized  that  in  most  cases  it  is  not
the  resolution  of  the  specific  dispute  under  consideration  which  is  more
important.  Rather,  it  is  the  efficient  and  just  future  functioning  of  the
overall  system  which is  the  primary  goal  .... ""
As  a  consequence  of  Jackson's  redefinition  of  the  national  state's
appropriate  role, the  system  which  Jackson  promotes  is  no longer  that  of
public  international  law.  In  one  sense,  the  state remains  the  defining  unit
for international  economic  law,  as  it was  for public  international  law.  In-
deed,  the  "more  restrained"  definition  for  international  economic  law
Jackson  proposes,  involving  transactions  "that  cross  national  borders"
and  the  "establishment  on  national  territory  of  economic  activity  of
persons  or firms  originating  from  outside  that  territory,"'"  is  obviously
parasitical  on  the  public  international  law  scheme  of territorial  jurisdic-
tion.  Here, however,  the  point is  not  to  relate governments  peacefully  to
one  another  in  a broader international  public  law regime,  but  to facilitate
"flows"  across  their  boundaries  by  eliminating  national  governmental
interference.
The  state's  role  is  either  passive,  like  a  map,  staying  out  of the  way
as  economic  activity  flows  about,  or facilitative,  enlisted  in  the  imple-
101.  Id. at  86-87  (adapting  from  Jackson,  Crumbling  Institutions,  supra  note  112,
at  98-101;  Jackson,  Governmental  Disputes,  supra  note  97,  at  3-4).
102.  Id. at  109.
103.  Id. at  112.
104  Id. at  21.
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mentation  of international  objectives.  In  this,  international  economic  law,
like  public  international  law, insists  on  the obsolescence  of sovereignty.
Only here,  the sovereign  has  not been  embroidered  in  a broader politics,
but  has  disintegrated  into  a  broader  economy.  The  international  legal
system  to be developed  is  moving,  not toward  centralization,  but toward
fragmentation,  as  individuals  at  all  levels  become  its  agents  in  myriad
proliferating  contexts  and  institutions.  Jackson  notes  the  increasing
"balkanization"  of  dispute  resolution'0  and  stresses  the  importance  of
bilateral  or  "minilateral"  negotiations"  and  "citizen  initiative."'"
The  result is  again  a  regime  divided  into  two  zones:  one of  interna-
tional economic  flows,  and  another of  the underlying  terrain  of national
politics. The  upper zone  is sophisticated,  rational,  and humane;  the lower
zone is  murky,  indulgent, physical,  and  frightening.  In  this,  Jackson  has
reversed  his  initial  anxieties  about  interdependence.  We  are  no  longer
situated nationally,  anxious  about  things  foreign.  We  are  now  secure  in
the cosmopolitan  world  of  international  economic  law,  and  uneasy  only
about the shady  doings  of an outmoded  national  politics.
It  is  a  structure  which Jackson  naturalizes  throughout  the  book  with
metaphor,  exactly  as  many  public  international  lawyers  naturalized  their
policy  proposal  with  the  metaphor  of  an  evolution  from  primitivism.
Here, however,  the image is spatial-a  "landscape"-rather  than  tempor-
al."  The  conclusion  vividly  presents  the  international  trade  regime,
not  as  an  embryo  about  to  be  born,  but  as  an  anatomically  detailed
body in  space:
What we  have  explored  in  the preceding  chapters  can  be  characterized  as
the "constitution"  for international  trade  relations  in the  world  today.  It is
a very complex mix  of economic and governmental  policies,  political  con-
straints,  and above  all  (from  my perspective)  an intricate set of constraints
imposed  by  a variety  of  "rules"  or  legal  norms.  It  is  these  legal  norms
which provide  the  skeleton  for the  whole  system.  Attached  to  that  skele-
ton are  the softer  tissues of policy  and  administrative  discretion.  Even the
skeleton  is  not rigid or  always  successful  in  sustaining the  weight  placed
upon  it.  Some  of  the  "bones"  bend  and  crack  from  time  to  time.  And
some  of the tissues  are  unhealthy."°
105.  Id. at  52.
106.  Id. at  110-11.
107.  Id. at  103-14.
108.  See,  e.g.,  JACKSON,  supra note  1, at  28  (describing  "landscape  of international
economic  institutions");  id. at  251  (referring  to  "landscape  of national  and  internation-
al  rules").
109.  JACKSON,  supra note  1, at  299.
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The  body  is  fragile,  the  prognosis  uncertain.  No  one  can  say  "for  cer-
tain"  that  "worldwide  economic  disaster"  can  be  avoided."'  Indeed,
Jackson,  like  Kelsen,  is  adept  at  wrapping  his  polemics  in  apocalyptic
invocations,  such  as  "[o]ne  can  only  hope  that  mistakes  of  the  1920s
and  1930s  can  be  avoided.""'  Jackson  ends  the  book  with  the  hope
that  the  body  will  experience  the  "predictability  and  stability  needed  not
only  for solid economic  progress,  but also  for the  flexibility  necessary  to
avoid  floundering  on  the  shoals  of  parochial  special  national  inter-
ests."' 
12
The  metaphoric  change  suggests  the  difference  between  Jackson  and
public  international  lawyers  like  Hans  Kelsen  as  polemicists.  Kelsen's
metaphor  was  temporal,  naturalizing  his  advocacy  of a new  international
regime  as  evolution,  and  the  public  international  lawyer  has,  in  many
ways  remained  frozen  in  the  becoming  of  that regime.  Jackson's  spatial
metaphor  welcomes  the  neophyte  into  the  natural  architecture  of an  ex-
isting  regime.  Jackson's  objective  is  not  to  further  progress  toward  a
new  regime,  but to  improve  management  of the  "world  trading  system."
It  is the  "economic  diplomats"  who,  in Jackson's  final  sentence,  "we"
hope  will  steer international  economic  law  clear  of the  shoals  of "paro-
chial  special  national  interests.""' 3  In  the  only  passage  in  the  book  ad-
dressing  the  reader  as  a  "you,"  Jackson  suggests  who  these  economic
diplomats  might  be.  In  the  very  first  sentences  of  the  book,  Jackson
presents  "puzzles"  which  call  for thought experiments:  "Suppose  you  are
the  minister  for  trade  of a  small  Asian  country  that  is  rapidly  develop-
ing,"  and  "[s]uppose  you  are  advising  a  large  multinational  corporation
based  in  the  United  States.""'4  The  reader  is  not  asked  to play  the  role
of  an  "economist"  or  "expert,' '15  but  of  a  policy  maker  outside  the
explicitly  international  institutional  structure.  Public  international  law
texts  are  always  asking  us  to  imagine  ourselves  working  for  the  State
Department,  the  United  Nations,  or as  citizens  engaging  in civil  disobe-
dience  or  working  for  non-governmental  advocacy  groups,  struggling  to
build a new international  society.  Jackson  has  us  working for  companies,
law  firms,  and  governments,  all  representing  clients  with  economic  inter-
ests.
110.  Id. at  308.
111.  Id.  at  187.
112.  Id. at  308.
113.  JACKSON,  supra note  1,  at  308.
114.  Id.  at  1.
115.  Cf.  id.  at  2  (noting  puzzle  not  solvable  by  any  one  academic  discipline).
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We  can  now  begin  to  make out Jackson's  own  charge  to  the policy
establishment:  to  beat  their plowshares  into  r6sum6s.  Jackson's  is  a call
to work rather  than  to  public  participation.  It is  a call  to  work  not with
a personal  commitment  to  renewal  of the  international  order, but with a
day-to-day  creativity  in the exploitation  of  opportunities  for wise  action
within  the international  trade  system.  Jackson  addresses  not  a citizen  in-
telligentsia  concerned  about  peace,  but students  interested  in  careers  in
international  economic  law.  In  this  sense,  Jackson  is  an  American  pro-
fessor of international  law.
III.  THE SUBSTANTIVE  CHAPTERS:  A  COSMOPOLITAN
ARCHITECTURE  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  LAW
The  bulk of Jackson's  book  takes  up  the  substantive  structure  of the
international  economic  law  regime.  Four  chapters  consider  the  most
significant  regulatory  principles  governing  the  normal  trade  situation:
tariff reduction,  most-favored-nation  status,  non-discrimination,  and  per-
missible  safeguards  and  adjustment  mechanisms." 6  Three  chapters  con-
sider  more  abnormal  or  exceptional  situations:  national  policies  which
might legitimately  "compete"  with a free  trade orientation,  and responses
to  "unfair"  trading  practices  like  dumping  and  subsidies."'  Two  chap-
ters take  up "economies  that  do not well  fit the roles of the world  trad-
ing system":  developing  economies  and  state traders."8
In  their  overall  pragmatism,  these  chapters  confirm  Jackson's  public
international  law  lineage.  Jackson  builds  upon  the  elements  of  interna-
tional  policy  pragmatism:  a  proliferation  of  contexts  and  players,  an
admixture  of law and  politics,  a rejection  of fetishism about  sovereignty,
a  modesty  about  reform,  an  evolutionary  progressive  faith,  a  skepticism
of grand  theoretical  claims  or plans,  a  practical  orientation,  and  a  case-
by-case  approach.  Bargaining  occurs  over the meaning  or range  of legal
and political  solutions, as  well  as  over their content."9
We  are  far from  formalism.  All  the  key  terms-  "subsidy,"  "tariff,"
even  "product,"  "industry,"  and  "causation"--are  presented  as  ambigu-
ous."  Although  meanings  will  be  open  to  negotiation,  even  the  basic
116.  Id. chs.  5-8.
117.  Id. chs.  9-11.
118.  Id.  chs.  12-13.
119.  In  discussing  the  myriad  specific  tariff  "bindings"  or  "concessions"  which
make  up  the  bulk  of  the  GATI  rule  system,  for  example.  Jackson  stresses  the  bar-
gained,  potentially  reciprocal,  dimension  of  both  political  exceptions  and  legal  commit-
ments.  Id. at  118-26.
120.  See  especially  his  discussion  of GAIT  Article  XIX, id. at  156,  159-60.  intro-
1995] 695AM.  U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
bargaining  concepts  are  ambiguous.  We  cannot  be  sure  what  a "recipro-
cal"  deal  might  be,  nor  whether  a  nation  has  bargained  for  an  "advan-
tage."''  Indeed,  people  often  call  their  actions  "concessions"  when
these  actions  should be  seen  as having  been  to  their  advantage  and  vice
versa.  Even  the  basic  policy  arguments  and  legal  interpretations,  which
might be helpful  in sorting  out  whether  a deal was  reciprocal  or whether
an  advantage  was  obtained,  are  insufficiently  precise.  Legal  interpreta-
tions  and  policies  inevitably  conflict,'  and  the  policy  scientist  cannot
say  which  interpretation  is  right."
Throughout  the  book,  dozens  of terms-some  technical,  others  collo-
quial-are  "placed"  in  quotations,  not  to  ground  the  term  in  authority
(Jackson  is  not  quoting  anyone  in  particular),  but  to  signal  his  distance
from  any  formal  or  essential  approach  to  the  language  of  international
economic  policy.  Everything  is  a  term  of  art,  as  if  the  modifier  "so-
called"  were placed  before  every  noun,  Jackson  sharing  with  the  reader
a  sophisticated  appreciation  for  the  ambiguity  of  all  terms  of  art.  The
only  people  who  appear  in  the  text  as  authorities  to  stabilize  this  in-
terpretive  ambiguity  are  unnamed  policy  managers-a  "European  diplo-
mat" or a "senior  GAT  official"  who  provide  aphorisms  and anecdotes.
The  ground  is  a  cosmopolitan  present,  peopled  by  roles.  Jackson  cabins
the  policy  process  only  with  a  hope  and  an  apocalyptic  invocation
should  we  lose our orientation.'24
Jackson's  departure  from  the  sensibility  of public  international  law  is
as  stark  as  the  continuity  of his  pragmatism.  He  transforms  the  possi-
bility,  direction,  and  politics  of public  policy,  both  nationally  and  inter-
nationally.  Jackson  puts  in  question  the  entire  notion  of  a  peculiarly
international  order-indeed  of a juridically  structured  order  at  all.  Jack-
son  fragments  both  the  subjects  and  arena  of  international  order,  envi-
sioning  a  shifting  process  of  bargaining,  at  once  legal  and  political.  He
reorients  us  away  from  the  level  at  which  the  economic  law  regime
operates  and  toward  its  substantive  spirit  and  policy  orientation."
From  this  vantage  point,  he  offers  the  policy  scientist  a  substantially
narrowed  vision  of  the  possibilities  for  national  public  policy  and  a
ducing  the  idea  of "variable"  concepts.
121.  See  id. ch.  5.
122.  Id. at  170-72.
123.  Id. at  172.
124.  See,  e.g.,  id. at  187.
125.  For  a  comparable  deconstructive  move  in  public  international  law  see  Philip
Allott,  Power Sharing In  The Law of the Sea,  77  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.  1, 5-6  (1983).
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transformation  of international  public  policy  from  the  sphere  of politics
to  that  of  technical  expertise.  The  result  is  an  international  economic
law  regime  with  a  completely  different  geography  from  that  of  earlier
internationalist  dreams.
We  should  take  the elements  of this  dramatic  reorientation,  this  move
from  metropolitan  to cosmopolitan,  one  at  a  time. Jackson's  broad rear-
rangement  of  both  the  players  and  the  field  of international  order,  to
focus  on spirit rather than  structure,  is  evident  in  the general  framework
and role he gives  to international  economic  law  and  in his chapter  seven
treatment  of  safeguards.'"  The  consequent  narrowing  of national  public
policy  is  well-illustrated  both  by  chapter  seven  and  by  chapter  nine,
which  concerns  national  policies  which  "compete"  with  liberal  trade
objectives. 7  Chapters  ten  (on  anti-dumping  rules)"  and  eleven  (on
subsidies),"  which  together  address  what  are  often  thought  "unfair"
trading  practices,  give  a  sense  of  the  difficulties  of mounting  an  inter-
national public  policy to  replace  what has  been  lost at the national  level.
Jackson  presents  the  managed  reduction  of  barriers  to  trade  as  the
core  problem  of  international  economic  law.'"  The  book  is  concerned
with  an  idealized  world  of  governmental  behavior  in  which  the  key
actors  are  the  policy  makers  of  the  national  and  international  regimes.
The  basic  activity  is  the levying  of tariffs  and  their removal  or  reduc-
tion. Governments  set tariffs,  disrupting  the flow  of trade,  and  the  inter-
national  economic  regime  tries  to  reduce  or  eliminate  the  disruption
through law,  politics,  bargaining,  or adjudication,  initiated  either  private-
ly or publicly.
It is  important  to  remember  that  this  idealized  structure  of  national
regulation  is  all  background  to  an  idealized  vision  of  normal  trade
among  private  traders.  In  this  market  foreground,  presumptively  private
players  are  continuously  bargaining  and  dealing,  reaching  out  to  one
another  across  an  abyss  of  uncertainty  to  engage  in  commercial
transactions  on the basis  of a stable currency.  In  this book, Jackson  tells
us very  little about  the legal  or political  basis  for  this activity.  There  is
nothing,  for  example,  about  the  law  of  international  commercial  con-
tracts.1 3'  He  does,  however,  tell  us  two  crucial  things.  First,  given  the
126.  JACKSON,  supra note  1, at  149-88.
127.  Id. at  203-16.
128.  Id. at  217-48.
129.  Id. at  249-74.
130.  Id. at  149.
131.  For a  fuller  treatment  of these  matters,  see  JACKSON  & DAVEY,  supra note  2,
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number  of practical  departures  and  exceptions,  the  focus  on  the  indus-
trial  trade  in  goods,  imagined  as  an  activity  of private  traders,  may  be
as  much  the  exception  as  the  rule.'32  Second,  the  international  econom-
ic  regime  handles  this  problem  by assimilating  these  exceptions  as far  as
possible  to  the  core image of an  arm's-length  private  transaction  through
the use of analogy.
In  this,  international  economic  law  facilitates  the  risk-taking  behavior
of  private  traders  by  modeling  it:  developing  international  rules  about
contracts  and  private  property,  and  policies  of privatization  and  currency
stabilization  to  serve  the  imagined  needs  and  interests  of "normal"  pri-
vate  traders.  Where  trade and  traders  are not  "normal,"  the  policy  scien-
tist can  devise  exceptional  and  temporary  adjustment  policies  by  analo-
gy, treating  the state  trader's  exports  for dumping  purposes,  for example,
on  the basis of a constructed  cost.'33
This  basic  approach  is  important  because  international  economic  law
takes  the  same  attitude,  imagining  all  governmental  activity  as  either  a
barrier  or a  spur to  trade.  The  image  of nations  assessing  and  reducing
tariffs  is  the  basic  conception.  Other  governmental  activity  is considered
against  this  image  and  is  taken  up  in the  order of our relative  ability  to
analogize  a given  activity  to  this  structure.  Thus,  we  move  from  tariffs
to  quantitative  restrictions  (which  are  elaborately  demonstrated  to  be
equivalent  to  tariffs),  to  subsidies,  and then  to  other "nontariff  barriers."
Jackson  describes  the  landscape:  "The  receding  waters  of  tariff  and
other  overt  protection  inevitably  uncover  the  rocks  and  shoals  of
nontariff  barriers  and  other  problems.""'  As  it  turns  out,  the  range  of
governmental  activities  which  can  be  analogized  to  the  tariff,  like  the
number of human  social  activities  which  can be  reimagined  as bargained
exchanges  among  separate  private  actors,  seems  limited  only  by  the
imagination.
One  consequence  is  that  the  stringency  of  the  policy  system,  the
intensity  of  the  bargaining,  the  strength  of  the  rules,  and  the  overall
clarity  of the  policy  choices,  relax  as  we  move  outward  from  the  core
of  tariff reduction,  just  as  the  precision  of  the  private  trading  system
erodes  as  we move  toward  trade in services,  bartered  exchanges,  transfer
ch.  2.
132.  See  id. at  139-40  (stating  that  industrial  trade  in  goods  accounts  for  only
fraction  of actual  world  trade;  percentage  would,  of course,  be  even  less  if  transfer
priced  trade  within  enterprises  and  bartered  exchanges  were  considered).
133.  JACKSON,  supra note  1, at  221-22.
134.  Id. at  4.
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pricing,  and  government  procurement.  In  the  case  of  private  contracts,
we  usually  react  to  this  erosion  with  some  alarm,  even  moral  indigna-
tion,  and  a call for  the restructuring  of what could  seem corrupt insider
deals into  arm's-length transactions  so  as to narrow  the gap between  law
and society.  In the case of government  regulation,  however, we have  an
altogether  different  reaction.  Particularly  if  we  have  a  background  in
public  international  law,  we might  anticipate  that  as  the analogy  neces-
sary  to see national  governmental  activity  as  a  barrier  to  trade  becomes
attenuated, the legitimacy of international  intervention  will  fade. We will
enter what  a  public  international  lawyer might  call  the  zone  of "exclu-
sive domestic jurisdiction"  or "sovereignty."
The  interesting  point  is  that  Jackson  reacts  to  this  inevitable  erosion
of the  model  of tariffs  as  we  might  to  the  erosion  of contract.  We  re-
member  that for Jackson,  arguments  about  "sovereignty"  are  no  longer
meaningful  in  an  interdependent  world.  Consequently,  as  the  analogy
weakens,  and  as  the  international  policy  machinery  becomes  both  more
complex  and  less  effective,  governments  are, Jackson  asserts,  more  able
to hide  their parochialism,  more  likely to manipulate  the rules,  and  more
ingenious  in their  efforts  to  thwart  free-trade  objectives.  As  it becomes
conceptually  more  difficult  to  see  governmental  action  as  a  quantifiable
barrier  to  trade,  Jackson presents  the national  authorities  as  increasingly
sneaky  and  cynical  in pursuit  of their  parochial  aims."  Actually,  Jack-
son  suggests,  there is  no  limit  to  the ingenuity  with  which governments
can invent  ways  to get around  their basic  obligations  and reintroduce  (in
the form  of non-tariff  barriers)'"  barriers  to  trade previously  eliminated
by tariff  concessions.  It is  like evading  the income tax.'"
Were  they  upfront  about  it, governments  would  be as  open  to  good-
faith bargaining  or reciprocal  concessions  in  the area of non-tariff barri-
ers  as  they  are  about  tariffs.  The  process  of  international  economic
bargaining  can  deal easily  with  tariffs  and  relatively  easily  with  quotas,
but things  become more  difficult for  subsidies and  practically  impossible
for other non-tariff barriers.  When  it comes  to  non-tariff barriers,  rather
than  trying  to  define  a  level  of  national  governmental  activity  as  off
limits  to  the  international  regulator,  Jackson  focuses  on  the  need  for a
135.  Id. at  129-31.  It  is  no  wonder  that  in  the  recent  GAT"  round,  negotiators
have  pressed  the  "principle"  of "tariffication  without  exception"  to  force  conversion  of
all  trade  restrictions  into  tariffs.  Francis  Williams,  Uruguay Deadline Seen  as Last
Chance, FIN.  TIMES,  Sept.  30,  1993,  at  8.
136.  JACKSON,  supra note  1, at  130.
137.  Id.
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change  in  spirit  at  the  national  level:  the  enlistment  of  national  policy
managers  to  the  broader goals  of liberal  trade. 3
Ultimately,  this  change  in  spirit  is  far  more  important  than  a  rear-
rangement  of jurisdictions  or the  development  of a particular  internation-
al  institutional  apparatus.  Indeed,  Jackson  is  no  knee-jerk  supporter  of
either  the  international  or  the  multilateral.  In  discussing  the  most-fa-
vored-nation  obligation  and  "its  politics,"  for example,  Jackson describes
a  policy  both  legal  and  non-legal,  to be  carried  out  both  multilaterally
and  bilaterally.  Because  the  multilateral  process  seems  to  have  gotten
stuck,  Jackson  supports  bilateral  moves  to  stimulate  trade-so  long  as
the  policy  experts  at  the national level  operate  in  the right  spirit.'39
For  Jackson,  the  goal  is  no  longer  rearranging  sovereigns  into  an
international  legal order.  Policy might  be  bilateral  or multilateral,  formu-
lated by  governments  or private parties,  internationally  or nationally. The
issue  is  the spirit  with  which  policy  is devised-whether  it advances  the
project  of  international  economic  law.'"  This  shift  away  from  a  coher-
ent and  progressively  developing  international  regime  of delineated  com-
petencies  toward  a more  fluid  network  of shifting  bargains,  united  only
by  an  orientation  toward  liberal  trade,  defines  Jackson's  cosmopolitan
vision  most  cleanly.
Throughout  the  book,  Jackson  gives  short  pragmatic  sermons  about
the  constant  temptation,  and,  consequently,  the  enduring  reality  of offi-
cial  cynicism  and  manipulation,  inevitably  shading  off  into  a  parochial
politics. 4'  His  proposal  is  to  bring  these  activities  to  light,  placing  all
such  temptations  in  a general  process  of mutual  awareness  and  bargain-
ing,  in  the  hope  that,  like  tariffs,  they  will  be  reduced  by  mutual  con-
cession.  Given  the  strength  of the  temptations,  and  the meager  and  am-
biguous  conceptual  framework  for  such  a  discussion,  he  is  inevitably
modest  in  his  expectations.  Indeed,  we  can  really  only  hope  that  gov-
ernments  will  take  their  cue  from  the  international  policy  scientist  and
become  more  responsible.  It  is  at this  point that  Jackson  invokes a  cata-
strophic  image  of  autarchy  and  war  to  kick-start  the  reorientation  of
spirit he  thinks  necessary.
Transparency-the  transformation  of hidden  governmental  policies  into
138.  Id. at  123-26.
139.  See  id. at  145-48.
140.  Id.
141.  See,  e.g.,  id. at  135  (discussing  preferential  systems  in  relation  to  most-fa-
vored-nation  status);  id. at  149-53  (identifying  arguments  for  safeguards  measures);  id.
at  165  (discussing  Article  19  obligations).
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quantifiable  trade  restraints  which  might  then  be the  object  of bargain-
ing--creates  what might be thought of as  a  market for policy. The dan-
ger,  of course,  is  that this  process  of reinterpretation  will  be  taken  too
far,  disrupting  even  the  settled  norms  of  private  law  which  facilitate
commerce  by  seeing  them  as  political  choices.  This  danger  is  often
thought  of  as  the  threat  posed  to  national  "culture"  by  international
technocratic  governance,  a  danger  inherent  in  broad  scale  trade  talks
such  as  America's  Structural  Impediments  Initiative  with  Japan.  Here,
the  cosmopolitan  leaves  us  only  with  caution  and  recognition  of  the
importance of differences  in generating  trade through comparative  advan-
tage.  There  can  be  no  sure  line  between  national  regulation  which
should be foresworn,  harmonized,  or bargained,  and  the  more  apolitical
background  norms  and  cultural  differences  which  are  to  be  left  intact,
any  more  than  there  can be a  clear  line  between  public  and  private  in  a
post-sovereign  world.  For Jackson,  a  reciprocal  national  vigilance  about
what seems  foreign  "unfairness,"  moderated  by awareness  of the  irreduc-
ibility  of differences  among  national  economic  cultures,  provides  a sort
of interface  between  necessarily  different national  regulatory  systems.
This  approach  is  apparent  in his  presentation  of national  "safeguards"
and  "adjustments."' 42  It  is  perfectly  legitimate  for  nations  to  help  their
societies  adjust  to  an  open-trade  regime.  As  trade  barriers  fall,  Article
XIX  of  the  GATI  permits  restrictions,  and  when  justified,  these  are
what  we  might  term  "industrial  policy."'43  Jackson  warns,  however,
that these  "economic  adjustment"  goals  are  almost  always  enmeshed  in
"practical  politics.'"  Indeed,  the  ambiguity  of  the  concepts  involved
makes  it practically  impossible  to  tell  where  adjustment  ends  and  pro-
tection  begins  and  makes  all  legal  and  policy  regimes  attempting  to
demarcate  legitimate  and  illegitimate  safeguard  activity  complex  and
uncertain.  In the  end, Jackson  suggests,  there  simply is  no practical  way
either finally  to prohibit  or permit  safeguards  and  adjustment  policies  at
the national  level."4s  It  will  be  a  matter  of  individual  choice  and  orien-
tation.
For Jackson,  the  way  out  is  not  to propose  any  single  institutional  or
legal  solution for which  right-thinking  policy  managers  will be  recruited,
but to  place safeguard  policies,  in  the broadest  sense,  among  the  decen-
tralized  bargaining  chips  in  international  economic  negotiation,  like
142.  See  id.  at  149-57.
143.  Id. at  151-58.
144.  Id. at  149.
145.  Id. at  184-87.
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tariffs. 4  This  avoids  the  pretense  of  a  legal  solution,  but  sets  in  mo-
tion  a  process  that  avoids  excessively  prolonged  adjustments  or protec-
tion  masquerading  as  industrial  policy.  In  the end,  he  asserts,
[i]t  is  difficult  at  this juncture  to  evaluate  the  potential  for  progress  on
safeguards  discipline  in  the  near  future.  Nevertheless,  it  does  appear  that
the  lack  of substantial  progress  on  this  matter  poses  risks  in  an  increas-
ingly  interdependent  world.  One  can  only hope  that  mistakes  of the  1920s
and  1930s  can  be  avoided.147
That  the  matter  had  been  one  of spirit  rather  than  structure  was  evident
in  his  introduction  of the  topic:
If  there  were  no  "liberal  trade"  policy  or  practice,  we  would not  need  to
consider  safeguards  as  such.  It  is  only  because  international  economic
policies  have  emphasized  reduction  of  border  barriers  to  trade  that  the
subject  of safeguards,  as  an exception  to  the  general  rule  of liberal-trade
opportunities,  comes  into play. '"
It  would  be  easy  to  miss  the  significance  of  this  approach  and  to
underestimate  its  difference  from  the  contemporary  public  law  pragma-
tism of the "international  legal  process"  and  "transnational"  schools  who
inherited  public  international  law's  pragmatism.  Like  them,  Jackson
analogizes  many  different  types  of activities  to  pronouncements  of  the
sovereign.  Like  them,  he  transforms  an  ambiguous  set  of  policy  and
legal  interpretive  choices  into  an  ongoing  decentralized  process  of bar-
gaining  and  mutual  accommodation.  Jackson's  suggestion  that  national
particularist  activities  come  out  as  formally  visible  barriers  to  trade  in  a
decentralized  international  bargaining  process 49  resembles  the  efforts  of
public  international  lawyers  to  see any  contact  between  people  of differ-
ent  nationalities  as  the  international  public  order  at  work.  But  Jackson
does  not  drift  toward  national  or  private  law.  On  the  contrary,  in  his
vision,  the domestic  policy  manager has  been  reinvigorated  by  an  inter-
nationalist  spirit.
Unlike  these  public  law  scholars,  however,  Jackson  does  not  present
his  bargaining  process  as  a regime,  nor  his  free-trade  orientation  as  an
international  public  policy  choice  to  be  implemented  by  an  international
policy  apparatus,  however  decentralized.  He  does  not  accompany  his
criticism  of national  particularism  with  advocacy  of  a  broader  interna-
146.  Id.
147.  Id. at  187.
148.  Id.  at  149.
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tional  regime.  He  does  not  imagine  that  good  international  rules  might
reduce  the  conceptual  difficulties  obscuring  the  legal  distinction  between
legitimate  and  illegitimate  national  action.  In  fact,  his  view  is  quite  the
opposite.
Jackson  presents  national  policy  either  as  already  part of international
economic  law  (because,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  facilitates  international
economic  activity)  or as  an  unfortunate  deviation.  In Jackson's  view,  the
choice  is  not  between  those areas  of national  public  life  which  are  part
of  "domestic  jurisdiction"  and  those  which  have  come  to  be  regulated
internationally,  but  between  areas  that  do  and  do  not  support  liberal
trade.  The  public  international  mind  searches  for  a  way  to  understand
this  shift.  It  only  seems  possible  within  an  invigorated  monism,  in
which  all of national  policy has become  subject  to  the international  pub-
lic  policy  of trade  liberalization,  enforced,  however  imperfectly,  by  the
GATT  and the  primitively  decentralized  institutions  of  the  international
public  regime.  Again,  nothing  could  be  further  from  Jackson's  concep-
tion. International  policy  is simply  absent from  his  system,  other than  as
the working  out of reciprocal  self-restaint.
This  approach  to  national  public  policy  is  most  evident  in  chapter
nine,  which  explicitly  considers  national  policies  which  "compete"  with
liberal  trade  objectives.5'  Jackson  identifies  two  "threads"  that  run
through the  chapter  "the  existence  of important  policies  competing  with
those  of comparative  advantage  and  liberal  trade,  and  the  desirability  of
protecting  the  value  of  tariff  and  other  trade  rules  by  plugging
'loopholes'  and  preventing  the protectionist  use of a variety  of ingenious
import  restraints.'"'  The  core  opposition  is  familiar-national  policies
which  promote  liberal  trade  and  the  ingenious  exploitation  of so-called
loopholes  for  parochial  objectives.  This  chapter  considers  situations
which  depart  from  that  general  structure,  "in  which  import-restraining
activity  is  required by legitimate  government goals."'I
These  situations  turn  out  to  be  few  in  number  and  hard  to  specify.
The most obvious case is "national  security,"  and Jackson quickly  recog-
nizes  that "the  competing  policy  of protecting  a nation's  continued  exis-
tence  is obviously more  important than economic  welfare or other poten-
tial  benefits  of  comparative  advantage."' 5  It  turns  out,  however,  that
150.  Id. at  201-16.
151.  Id.  at  203.
152.  Id.
153.  Id.  It  is  interesting  that  the  "benefits  of  comparative  advantage,"  introduced
quite  modestly,  appear  here  as  a  sizeable  and  concrete  factual  matter  to  be  weighed
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policy  makers  are  often  mistaken  in  developing  national  security  poli-
cies.  For  example,  "[i]n  a  world  where  some  wars  could  be  over  in
minutes,  traditional  notions  of the  need  for  production  facilities  are  not
always  applicable.' '
14  Indeed,  the  aggressive  pursuit  of  comparative
advantage  may  itself  maximize  security.  Import  restrictions  may  blunt
national  research  and  technical  proficiency,  or  encourage  national  de-
fense  industries  to  go soft  in  the  absence  of vigorous  competition.
The  main  point,  however,  is  that  the  GATT  language  allowing  na-
tional  security  exceptions  is  so  broad,  self-judging,  and  ambiguous  that
it obviously  can  be  abused.  "It  has  even  been  claimed  that  maintenance
of shoe  production  facilities  qualify  for  the  exception  because  an  army
must  have  shoes!"'
55
This  problem  becomes  even  more  grave  when  we  come  to  the  "gen-
eral  exceptions  for  health  and  welfare."'' 6  Jackson  lists  the  exceptions
of  GAIT  Article  XX, 5 7  and  indicates  that  "[m]ost  of  these  measures
might  be  thought  of  as  falling  within  the  general  'police  powers'  or
'health  and  welfare  powers'  of  a  government."' 58  Again  the  crucial
point  is  that  "[m]any  of these  exceptions  are  quite  general;  for example,
'public  morals'  or  'human  health.'  Obviously,  clever  argumentation
could  be  used  to  justify  practices  which  have  as  their  secret  goal  pre-
venting  import competition." ' 9
Again,  the  difficulty  is  that  it  will  be  impossible  to  tell  in  any  clear
way  where  legitimate  objectives  shade  off into  the  illegitimate.  Jackson
works  through  a  number  of  examples  which  demonstrate  that  even  ap-
parently  legitimate  efforts  to  prevent  pollution  or promote  worker  safety
can  wreak  havoc  with  the  trade  system."  From  a  logical  point  of
view,  he  acknowledges,  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  argue  that  products
produced  under  less  stringent  national  labor,  safety,  pollution,  or health
against  national  existence.  Id.
154.  Id. at  203-04.
155.  Id. at  204.
156.  Id. at  206-08.
157.  Id.  at  206.  He  lists  public  morals,  protection  of human,  animal  or  plant  life
or  health,  gold  or  silver  trade,  customs  enforcement,  monopoly  laws  (antitrust),  pat-
ents,  trademarks,  copyrights,  preventing  deceptive  practices,  banning  products  of  prison
labor,  protecting  national  treasures,  conserving  natural  resources,  carrying  out  an  ap-
proved  commodity  agreement,  export  restrictions  to  implement  a  price  stabilization
program.  Id.
158.  Id.
159.  Id. at  207.
160.  Id. at  208-10.
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regulations  ought not be  imported.  Consequently,
[i]t is  an issue  fraught  with  dangerous  potential.  If this principle  were  ex-
tended...  it could be  the basis of a rash  of import restrictions,  often de-
feating  the  basic  goals  of comparative  advantage.  Government  regulations
vary  so  greatly  that  the  already  difficult  conceptual  questions  of  the
world's rules  on  subsidies  would  pale  into insignificance  beside  the  prob-
lems which  the  cost of regulation  equalization  would  create.'
The  solution  is  neither  an  international  regime  nor  recognition  of a
sphere  of  domestic  jurisdiction.  Instead,  Jackson  urges  us  to  move  in
two  familiar  directions.  First,  toward  vigilance  against  the  abusive  de-
ployment of these  exceptions,  and  second,  toward "'benign  neglect'  with
the  possibility  that  over  time  mahy  of  these  problems  will  sort  them-
selves  out  as the necessity  of health and  safety  regulation  becomes  more
apparent  to  more  nations."'"  As  policy  managers,  we  must  preserve  in
the  first  instance  our  free-trade  orientation,  avoiding  the  temptation  to-
ward  national  parochialism.  Rather  than  being  recruited  to  build  an
international  regime,  we  are  left  hoping  that  enlightenment  will  bring
regulatory  harmonization,  eliminating  the temptation  to use  these  excep-
tions  and  the  need for more  aggressive  international  enforcement.
There remains  one  sort of national  policy  which  should  be vigorously
pursued  to  prevent  private  parties  from  erecting  barriers  to  trade  com-
mensurate  with  the governmental  restrictions  so  laboriously  dismantled:
antitrust  laws."  Jackson  unleashes  national  governments  not  where
their  own  existence  is  at  stake,  but where  they  might  contribute  to  the
effort  to  remove  barriers  to  trade  by  focusing  on  the  private  barriers
they  seem  most  suited  to  police.  The  only  proviso  is  that  nations  not
use  their antitrust  policies  to  implement "buy  domestic"  attitudes.  Even
here,  Jackson  hesitates  to  advocate  substituting  an  international  for  a
national  regime.'"  Voluntary  codes  may  be  as  good  as  mandatory
ones,  and  national  enforcement  better  or  worse  than  international  en-
forcement. The  crucial  point is  that trade  barriers  must be reduced.
The  public  international  lawyer  may  have  difficulty  making  sense of
Jackson's  approach.  If a  public  international  lawyer wanted  to move  the
international  system  toward  more  liberal  trade,  he  would  seek  to  limit
governmental  actions  which  obstructed  this  goal.  He  would  rely  on  the
161.  Id.  at 210.
162.  Id.
163.  See id  at  211-13.
164.  Id.  at  212-13.
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decentralized  mechanisms  of the  international  regime,  and  enhance  both
the  strength  of  that  regime  and  its  commitment  to  free  trade,  perhaps
through  new  treaties,  institutions,  and  court  decisions.  Indeed,  it  is
tempting  to  understand  the  GATT  system  in just  these  terms.
By  contrast,  Jackson  begins  with  the  persuasiveness  to  policy  makers
of  liberal  trade  arguments,  and  analyzes  the  policy  dilemmas  which
result.65  National  governments  are,  and  will  be,  oriented  toward  free
trade.  In  public-international-law  speak,  they  are  already  the  primitive
decentralized  agents  of  an  international  free-trade  public  policy.  Where
they  can  do  more,  they  should  and  will.  When  it  comes  to  an  interna-
tional  regime,  Jackson  counsels  "benign  neglect."'"  His  concern  is
with  the  quite  serious  conceptual  difficulties-the  indeterminacies  of
rules  and  standards--one  encounters  in  trying  to  legislate  what  is  and
what  is  not  a  barrier  to  trade  or  a  legitimate  national  exception.  Only
vigilance  toward  devious  motives  at all  levels  can  answer this  threat.
In  chapters  ten  and  eleven,  Jackson  comes  closest  to  considering  the
possibility of an  international  public  policy  which,  from  a public  interna-
tional  lawyer's  perspective,  could  guarantee  limits  on  national  trade
policies  or  replace  the prerogatives  sacrificed  by  national  sovereigns  to
free  trade.'67  Both  chapters  take  up  the  distinction  in  the  liberal-trade
regime between  "fair" and  "unfair"  trade practices.  Chapter  ten considers
national  regimes'  responses  to  "dumping"  by  foreign  competitors."
Chapter  eleven  considers  national  export  "subsidies."'"  These  chapters
illustrate  two  related  approaches  to  what  we  might  think  of  as  interna-
tional  public  policy.
Jackson  begins  by  placing  the  terms  "fair"  and  "unfair"  quite  firmly
in  quotation  marks,  stating  that  "[t]he  distinction  between  fair and  unfair
trade  has  become  increasingly  blurred  in  recent  years,  partly  because  of
some  fundamental  disagreement  about  what  should  be  called  unfair."'7
People  use  the  terms  in  a  variety  of  shifting  and  vague  ways.  More
importantly,  however,  conflicts  about  the  meaning  of  fairness  reflect
unbridgeable  cultural  differences:  "Societies  and  their economic  systems
differ  so  dramatically  that  what  seems  unfair  to  members  of one  society
165.  Id.  at  203-13.
166.  Id. at  210.
167.  See  id. at  217-74.
168.  See  id. at  217-48.
169.  See  id. at  249-74.
170.  Id. at  217.
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may seem  perfectly  fair to  those of another  society.""'
As  public  international  lawyers,  we  are  immediately  drawn  to  the
possibilities for international  negotiation,  consensus  building,  treaty draft-
ing, adjudicating,  harmonizing,  carving  out spheres  of cultural difference
to  be  respected,  and  realizing  predictably  stable  international  terms  for
trade.  We  might  even  expect  Jackson,  a  well-known  proponent  of  free
trade,  to  begin  such an  international  exercise  by  treating  as  unfair  those
policies  which  distort  free  trade.  This,  however,  is  not  Jackson's  ap-
proach.
Instead,  Jackson  warns  us  that  "trading  practices  that..,  have been
considered  unfair because  they  interfere with  or distort free-market-econ-
omy  principles"  are  equally  difficult  to  specify."  The  problem  is  the
irreducible  differences  among  economies.
[E]ven  among  the  relatively  similar  western  industrial-market  economies,
there  are  wide  differences  to  do  with  the  degree  of government  involve-
ment  in  economy,  in  the  forms  of  regulation  or  ownership  of  various
industrial  or  other  economic  segments.  As  world  economic  interdepen-
dence  has  increased,  it has  become  more difficult  to  manage  relationships
among  various  economies."
Even  slight  differences  in  "acceptance  of  basic  free-market  economy
principles"  can  result  in  "situations  that  are  considered  unfair,  even
though  these  differences  may  not  have  resulted  from  any  consciously
unfair  policies or practices." 74
When  presented  with  the difficulty  of interpreting  liberal trade  princi-
ples  in  national  situations,  Jackson  responds  with  a  call  to  vigilance
against  national  tendencies  to  deviate,  hiding  their  parochialism  under
manipulations  of terms  like "barrier  to  trade."  When  presented  with  the
ambiguities  of  an  international  regulatory  term  like  "fairness,"  Jackson
responds  by  validating  the  diversity  of  national  interpretations.  Indeed,
an international  goal  to  achieve a "level  playing field" might "imply  that
all  governments  must  adopt  uniform  policies.""'  Even  economic  theory
stands against such a result, as comparative  economic  advantage depends
precisely  on  the  continued  existence  of  cultural  differences.  "Besides,"
Jackson  asks, "isn't  trade to  some  degree  based  on  differences  between
171.  Id. at  218.
172.  Id.
173.  Id.
174.  Id. at  219.
175.  Id. at  218.
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countries  . . . ?176
For Jackson,  the  difficulty  here  is
analogous  to  the  difficulties  involved  in  trying  to  get  two  computers  of
different  designs  to  work  together.  To  do  so,  one  needs  an  interface
mechanism  to  mediate  between  the  two  computers.  Likewise,  in  interna-
tional  economic  relations,  particularly  in  trade  relations,  some  "interface
mechanism"  may  be  necessary  to  allow  different  economic  systems  to
trade  together  harmoniously.'"
This  "interface"  concept  is  perhaps  the  book's  most  significant  and
original  contribution.  It  reappears  at  several  points  and  expresses  ex-
tremely  well  a  central  theme  of  Jackson's  approach  to  international
public  policy.  The  international  regime,  to  the  extent  it  must  exist,
should  be  quasi-mechanical  and  facilitative,  focusing  on  communication
and  correspondence  between  systems  rather  than  on  the construction  of a
new  international  legal  order or  system.  The  best  we  can  do  is  to  make
assumptions  and  approaches  visible,  and  hope  for  their  bargained  ame-
lioration  as  the liberal-trade  spirit becomes  more  widespread.
Jackson  illustrates  this  approach  in  his  discussion  of  national  anti-
dumping  regimes.'  Jackson,  like  many  other  international  economic
law  specialists,  is quite  skeptical  of anti-dumping  statutes.  It is  difficult,
as  an  economic  matter,  to  see  what  is  wrong  with  discriminatory  pric-
ing,  except  perhaps  in  limited  cases  of predatory  behavior. Even  then,  it
appears  a nation's  consumers  would  have  more  to  gain  than  its  produc-
ers  would  have  to  lose.  At  best,  it  is  difficult  to  measure  dumping  with
any  precision,  and  national  administration  of  anti-dumping  regimes,
triggered  by  national  producers'  complaints,  are likely  to provide  an  am-
ple  wardrobe  for  dressing  up  protectionist  measures  in  the  rhetoric  of
fairness.  At  worst,  anti-dumping  can  perpetuate  "medieval  notions  of
'fair  price."" 79  As  with  national  policies  which  might  be  exceptions  to
free  trade,  the case  for  anti-dumping legislation  is  clearest  when  it tracks
antitrust  concerns  most  closely,  enforcing  rather  than  disturbing  the
liberal  trade system.'
Nevertheless,  for  all  this  skepticism,  Jackson  advocates  neither  an
international  dumping  regime  restricted  to  antitrust  concerns  nor  a  man-
dated  dismantling  of  national  regimes.'8'  He  describes  ways  in  which  a
176.  Id.
177.  Id.
178.  Id. at  221-47.
179.  Id. at  223.
180.  See  id. at  223-25.
181.  Compare  Jackson's  follower Denton  on  this point.  Ross  Denton,  (Why)  Should
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national  anti-dumping  system  can  be  managed  without  using  it  as  a
means  of disguised  protection  through,  for example,  stringent  injury  and
causation  requirements.  Conceptual  and  legal  tools  are  not available  to
mandate this,  but vigilance  by  policy  managers  can help resist  the temp-
tation  toward disguised  protectionism.
Jackson  concludes  by  proposing  that  we  think of  anti-dumping  rules
as  an  "interface"  mechanism  through  which  differing  national  concep-
tions  of fairness will be brought visibly  into relationship  with  one anoth-
er."  He  suggests  that  the  rules  might  be  tested  against the  imperatives
of  trade  liberalization  and  be  the  subject  of a  shifting  negotiation  pro-
cess,  which will  be  legal and  political,  national  and  international,  private
and  governmental.  Jackson  writes:
Finally,  it  is  both  interesting  and  potentially  provocative  to  suggest  the
possibility  that  for  all  its  faults,  the  system  of antidumping  rules  may  be
performing  a useful function  in  world trade,  not as a response to  so-called
unfairness,  but rather  as  an "interface"  or buffer  mechanism  to  ameliorate
difficulties  ..  caused  by  interdependence  among  different  economic  sys-
tems.  Could  it  be  that  the  antidumping  rules  are  acting  as  a  crude  or
blunt  instrument  to  cause  different  economic  systems  to  more  equitably
share  the  burdens  of  adjusting  to  shifts  of world  trade  flow?  If so,  per-
haps  we  should  view  antidumping  rules  as  part  of the  subject  of "safe-
guards"  (described  in  chapter 7) rather  than  as part of a subject of "unfair
trade."
83
In  this  conception,  the  element  of  "unfairness,"  which  might  have
been  the  key  to  an  international  regime,  has  been  eliminated.  In  fact,
"[s]ome  of  the  'unfairness'  problems  are  in  reality  'difference'  prob-
lems.""'  Anti-dumping  regimes  are  reconceptualized  as  decentralized
mechanisms  to  facilitate  trade  liberalization.  This happens  either  directly
in cases of antitrust  violation,  or indirectly,  through  mechanisms  render-
ing visible the protectionist  sentiment  that  springs naturally  from  cultural
differences.  Such  a protectionist  sentiment  might  be  reduced  by  policy
managers  bargaining  in the spirit of free  trade.
If we are  to  think of  this as  an  international  public  policy  regime,  it
is  a  very  odd  one  indeed.  There  is  no  delimited  role  for  the  national
state,  nor for any  structured  international  legal  process. Rather,  we have
Nations  Utilize  Antidumping  Measures?,  11  MICH.  J.  INT'L  L.  224,  265-71  (1989)
(urging  public  interest  analysis  when  enforcing  anti-dumping  laws).
182.  JACKSON,  supra note  1, at  244.
183.  Id.
184.  Id. at  26.
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a  naturally  occurring  adjustment  process  operated  by  agents  of  liberal
trade  sentiment  throughout  the  existing  institutional  and  legal  system.
The  regime  follows  free  trade-not  promoting  it,  but  assisting  it,  mop-
ping up,  and adjusting-less  the  idea of a  regime  than  the regime  of an
idea.
Chapter eleven,  concerning  subsidies,  presents  a comparable  image  of
the  possibility  of  international  public  policy.s  The  visibility  of  subsi-
dy  policies  and  their  root  in  government,  rather  than  private  initiative,
makes  this  the most  fruitful  of various  "unfair"  trading  practices  around
which  to develop  an international  regime.
[B]y  way  of contrast  with  dumping  matters,  in  the  case  of  subsidies  we
are  almost  always  talking  about  government  action,  rather  than  to  indi-
vidual  enterprise  action.  Thus,  issues  of subsidies  and  countervailing  du-
ties are  often  significantly  more  visible  and involve  a higher  level  of gov-
ernment-to-government  diplomacy  than  do  many  other  trade  policy  mat-
ters.'
It  also  seems  an  appropriate  area  for  international  regulation  since  the
strongest  economic  argument  for  subsidy  reduction  is  at  the  aggregate,
international  level, rather  than  from  the perspective  of importing  nations,
wfhich  might well  benefit  from  a foreign  export  subsidy.'
Nevertheless,  Jackson  does  not  advocate  a  public  international  law-
style  regime  to  address  the  distortions  which  subsidies  might  bring  to
liberal  trade.  He  is  critical  of  the  existing  international  regime  for  at-
tempting  to  do  too  much  with  normative  concepts  far too  indeterminate
to  provide  much  guidance.'  The  existing  system  lacks  even  a  defini-
tion  of  "subsidy,"  and  therefore  allows  national  regimes  to  give  free
reign  to  their  protectionist  impulses  in  managing  countervailing  duty
mechanisms. 9
Jackson repeatedly  emphasizes  the "controversy,"  "perplexity,"  "confu-
sion,"  and  "ambiguity"  which plague  the subject.  Are subsidies "unfair"?
Do  they  damage  anyone  but  the  country  which  awards  them?  Should
trading  partners  respond  with  outrage  or  with  a  thank-you  note?  Can
subsidies be distinguished  from all other national  government  activity?  Is
every  government  policy  not  likely  to  reward  some  producers  and  shift
the  costs  of  participating  in  trade?  Can  "export"  subsidies  be  distin-
185.  See  id. at  249-73.
186.  Id. at  250.
187.  Id. at  252.
188.  Id. at  255-61.
189.  See  id. at  257-58.
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guished from  "general"  subsidies  with  any  precision?
In fact,  the  international  subsidies  regime  itself may  be  as  dangerous
as the practice  of subsidization.
[I]t  may  be  seen  that  the whole  area  of subsidies  activity  in  international
law, including  the rules designed  to constrain  the  use of subsidies  and  the
other rules designed  to  allow  national  governments  the  unilateral  privilege
of responding to  subsides with  countervailing duties,  is not only  extremely
complex  but holds  the  potential,  if  misapplied,  of undermining  the  basic
policy  goals  of the post-World  War II  liberal  trade  system',
The  problem  arises  because  "governments  can  use subsidies  to  evade  a
liberal trade  system"  while  at the same time "the unilateral  national gov-
ernment  response of countervailing  duties,  can be implemented  in such  a
way  as  to  undermine  liberal  trade policies."''  In  the  context  of  nation-
al temptation  to  misuse  controversial  and  ambivalent  international  rules,
the prospects  for an  international  regime  are  meager  indeed..
The  reader  may now detect  that  there  is great  controversy  about  economic
policies  with  respect  to  subsidies  in  international  trade.  It  is  not  possible
at  this point  in  time,  nor  in  this  book,  to  resolve  these  issues.  One  thing
is  clear:  for  more  than  a century,  the  international  trade  rules,  and some
national  systems,  have  been  established  on  the  basis  of  the  proposition
that  imports  which  are  subsidized  by  foreign  governments  are  somehow
,'unfair."1 92
Again  Jackson  builds  from  fact  subsidies  are  thought  unfair,  even  if
there is  no  good  reason  for thinking  so  or no clear  way  of  ascertaining
when.  As  a  result,  he  proposes  that  international  policy  makers  focus
quite narrowly  on  an  "actionable  subsidy,"  which  would  make  the  most
specific  and  trade  distorting subsidies visible subjects  of international  de-
bate. 3  He  does  not  propose  a  new  international  regime,  which  could
easily  become  the object  of manipulation.  Instead,  he suggests  "a  series
of principles  that could  be  entertained  by  negotiators  or national  policy
leaders  in  connection  with  the  further  elaboration  of  the  international
subsidy  rules."'94  Rather  than  a  regime,  we  get  guidance  in  right-think-
ing. Each principle  seems  aimed  at limiting  attention  to  the most  visible
and  formally  identifiable  subsidies,  narrowing  the  ambit  of  attempted
190.  Id. at  269.
191.  Id.
192.  Id. at  254.
193.  See  id. at  262-69.
194.  Id. at  270.
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policy  initiatives  both internationally  and nationally  which  might  backfire
against  the  liberal-trade  order.'  For  the  rest,  we  return  to  benign  ne-
glect,  relying  on  the  advancing  spirit of trade  liberalization.
IV.  A  COSMOPOLITAN  GEOGRAPHY:  INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC  LAW  AND THE  WORLD  TRADING  SYSTEM
The  trading  system  Jackson  describes,  the  "trade  constitution"  of
which  he  imaginatively  projects,  is  universal  in  both  aspiration  and  fact:
a "world"  trading  system,  to  which  the widest variety  of economies  and
national  regimes  are  assimilated.  From  a  metropolitan  point  of  view,
Jackson's  focus  on  the  United  States,  the  European  Community,  and
Japan  suggests  a  world  radiating  out  from  a  center  toward  a  periphery.
For  Jackson,  it  is  far  more  significant  that  the  trade  constitution  has
room  even for  "economies  that  do  not fit  the  rules  of the  world  trading
system,"  including  both  the  less  developed  and  those  with  nonmarket
economies.
Jackson's  international  spirit  is,  in  this  sense,  liberal  and  ecumenical.
In  considering  "state  trading  and  nonmarket  economies,"  he  observes
that  although  "the  post  World  War  II  international  trading  system  is
obviously  based  on rules  and  principles  which  more  or less  assume  free
market-oriented  economies,"  it  may  well  make  sense  to  seek  ways  of
"incorporating"  non-market  economies  into  this  system."  Although
Jackson  acknowledges  that  "the  assimilation  of China  into  the  GAIT  is
a  formidable  task,"  he  feels  an  "interface"  mechanism  might distinguish
those  aspects  of  the  international  regime  which  might  be  applied prima
facie to  non-market  economies  as if  their  trade  was  normal,  and  those
situations  which  would  need  to  be  bargained  into  correspondence,  by
analogy,  constructed  costs,  and  so  forth. 97
Jackson's  political  vision  is  equally  open  textured.  Although  he  in-
vokes  the  specter  of a dark  national  parochialism  to  orient  the  vigilance
of  his  new  economic  diplomats  and  managers,  it  is  hard  to  identify  a
national  partisan  political  program  which  cannot  be  accommodated  by  an
appropriate  "interface."  Perhaps  only  secretive  or  duplicitous  policies
which  do  not  make  themselves  available  to  reciprocal  bargaining.  But
195.  For  example,  Jackson  proposes  "specificity,"  "cross  border  effects,"  "per se
violations"  to  assist  "administrability,"  and  a  de  minimus  cut-off  rule.  Id.  at  270-71.
All  these  would  render  the  subsidy  subject  to  scrutiny  as  similar  in  its  identifiability
to  the  tariff  as  possible.  Id.
196.  Id. at  283.
197.  Id.  at  291.
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such  policies,  he  seems  sure,  are  likely  in  any  event  to  be  counterpro-
ductive and hard  to  sustain. Along  with  sovereignty,  the new  interdepen-
dence  has  eroded  the  possibility  for a national  regulatory  state to pursue
purely selfish  policies  without  taking  account  of international  pressures.
At the same  time, "interdependence"  does not  inaugurate  a new  inter-
national  political  order.  Jackson  does  not  propose  that  an  international
regime  legislate  a  liberal  trade  order.  He finds  the  basic  legal  terms  far
too  ambiguous  to  sustain  a  project  of  regime  building.  In  any  event,
Jackson has  left  the public  international  lawyer's  geography  of  interna-
tional  "planes"  and  national  sovereign  "spheres"  behind  in  favor  of  a
relentlessly  fragmented  order of conflicting sites  and subjects  for interna-
tional  bargaining  and  regulation.  Public  international  lawyers  typically
concluded  their  polemics  with  a  concrete  proposal  for  action  by  con-
cerned international  policy  scientists  and  politicians:  build an  internation-
al  court,  administration,  and  eventually  legislature,  which  might  then
pursue  an  international  politics  of development,  peace,  redistribution,  or
regulation.  In  its  place,  Jackson  leaves  us  only  with  participation  in  an
already  ongoing  process  of "management."  "The problem of international
economics  today,  then,  is  largely  a  problem  of  'managing'  interdepen-
dence."'98  The  public  international  policy  process  has  been  replaced  by
decentralized  adjustment  and  bargaining  by  managers  and  economic
diplomats  acting  out  of  an  invigorated  liberal  commercial  spirit  and
vigilant against  reassertions  of national  particularism.
In  the  final  chapter,  Jackson  assesses  the  "trade  constitution"  of  the
GATT  system.  Although  it "operates  better  than  any  one  had  reason  to
expect,"'"  he  nevertheless  acknowledges  that  it  "clearly  ...  is  defec-
tive."2 00  He  surveys  at  length  the  "weaknesses,"  "infirmities,"  and
"gaps"  in  the  system:  there  are  too  many  loopholes,  the legislative  ma-
chinery  is  defective,  much  economic  activity  remains  outside the GATr,
procedures  are  confused,  rule  implementation  is  lax.  Rather  than  pro-
posing  construction  of  a  new  international  regime  which  might  amelio-
rate  these  faults,  Jackson  treats  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  regime  he  has
imagined  as  a constitution,  and  then  focuses  on  ways  to  "manage  inter-
dependence"  in  this  situation.  He suggests  that  the  manager will  need  to
mix  a number of "techniques,"  including  those  given prominent  mention
198.  Id. at  4.
199.  Id. at  302.
200.  Id. at  307.
201.  Id. at  302-03.
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in  the  book:  harmonization,  reciprocity,  and  interface.2"  The  resolution
of  practical  dilemmas  concerning  the  appropriate  mix  of  political  and
economic  objectives,  or the  appropriate  role  for  law  and  the  distribution
of power between  courts  and  administrative  officials,  is  left to  the prac-
tice  of  economic  diplomats  and  managers.  These  managers  will  mesh
political,  legal,  and  economic  considerations,  acting  as  both  public  and
private  officials  both  nationally  and  internationally.
For  Jackson,  traditional  questions  about  the  politics  of  international
law  are  simply  not  easily  answered.  Jackson  asks,  for example,  whether
the  "world  trading  rules  are  fair  to  developing  countries."2'  It  turns
out that  the relevant rules  are  "remarkably  vague  and  'aspirational,"'  and
although  a  few  discriminate  on  their  face  against  developing  countries,
some  seem  to  favor  them.Y  But  Jackson  does  not  dwell  on  the  point,
for  "this  subject  has  been  extensively  treated  elsewhere  and  generally
involves  the  expertise  of  economists  rather  than  lawyers."25  He  sug-
gests  that  a  "deeper"  analysis  might  well  reveal  that  the  predominance
of  large  powerful  countries  in  the  institutions  of the  world  trading  sys-
tem  puts  developing  countries  at  somewhat  of  a  disadvantage,2"  ,or
might  focus  on  the  "question  of  debt."" 7  On  the  other  hand,  develop-
ing  countries  "are  able  to  take  advantage  of  either  explicit  or implicit
exceptions  in  GATJ  so  as  to  to  [sic] pursue  almost  at will  any  form  of
trade  policy  they  wish." 2 °s  In  the  end,  Jackson  leaves  these  questions
"to  works  that  are  more  focused  on  the  economic  considerations  of
world  trade."2"  International  economic  law  begins  where  the  policy  re-
sponses  to  these  difficulties  leave  off,  treating  their  resolution,  wise  or
unwise,  as  matters  of fact.
An  imaginary  trade  constitution,  liberal  trade ideas,  national  and  inter-
national  political  judgments,  a  decentralized  regime  of  bargained  reci-
procity:  Jackson  presents  all  these  as facts rather  than  commitments.  It
is  a  strategic  epistemology-the  cosmopolitan's  accrediting  claim  and
aura  of  contact  with  reality  are  a  matter  of its  internal  narrative.  As  a
result,  that Jackson presents  himself as  a realist means more  that  he  pre-
fers  a  case-by-case  approach  or  is  sophisticated  about  the  erosion  of
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sovereignty  and  avoids utopian  schemes.
His realism,  like that of the typical  public  international  law  scholar, is
also  a rhetorical  device.  Both  display  their  awareness  of the limits,  am-
biguities,  and  illusions  of  a  legal  and  policy  argument  which  relies  on
the traditional  vocabulary  of  sovereignty.  Both  invoke  a  world  of  facts
outside  of law-in  anthropology  or  economics  or politics-which  will
operate  as  a check  on  law's  illusions.  Both  place  an  interpretive  project
of  responding  to  these  facts  center  stage  as  a  project  of  personal  and
professional  commitment  by members  of their audience.  For  both, this  is
a largely technical project-deploying  the "technique"  of law  or "manag-
ing"  interdependence-which  holds  out  a  general  political  vision  of
peace  or economic  security  as  a  distant  promise  and  modest  hope.  It is
here  that we  encounter the policy  pragmatist  as  a polemicist,  situated  in
a  cultural  dialogue  with  an  audience-a  lav  faculty,  law  students-that
they might  experience  immersion  in  the  technocratic  as  mobilization  for
a  cause.
Beyond  highlighting  this  common  pragmatic  or  realist  international
style,  reading  Jackson  focuses  one  on  the  ongoing  development  in  the
field  of international  legal  commentary  generated  by  a  continuing  duet
between  their quite  different,  if equally  pragmatic,  sensibilities.  A  main-
spring of that  development  is  the repeated  deployment  of this  rhetorical
realism  as a criticism  of each  generation  by its  successors.  The  apparent
renewal  of this  relationship  to  the  real  gives  policy  pragmatism  a  pro-
gressive  sensibility,  constantly  working  against  past  abstractions  for
future  engagement.  The  result  is  a  continually  contested  intellectual
terrain,  hurrying  toward  an  internationalist  ideal  against  a  projected  fac-
tual  backdrop,  generating-almost  as  a  by-product-a  technocratic  re-
gime of rejected  sovereignties  and  political  dreams.
The  dialogue between  the relative  sensibilities of a  public  internation-
al  lawyer  and  Jackson  seems  to  address  the difficulties  of  this  interna-
tional  regime,  its  technocratic  excesses  and  political  weaknesses.  The
public  international  lawyer-hip  and  pragmatic-mobilizes  governments
to both multilateralism  and  internationalism. His  expectations  are modest,
but the  direction  is  sure.  He  sets  himself against  what  he  interprets  as
the  cosmopolitan's  defeatist  attitude  toward  public  order  or  ideological
commitment  to  private  ends  and  domestic  laws.  He will  renew  the inter-
national political  order  there should  be built  a great ark for international
policy,  many  cubits  in  all  directions,  and  there  should  be assembled  all
forms of public  life for embarkation.
Meanwhile,  the cosmopolitan  international  economic  lawyer  reinvents
the  terms  of  policy  debate,  placing  governments  and  companies  in  an
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idealized  and  incessant  process  of market  bargaining,  developing  a  cos-
mopolitan  6lan  at once vigilant  against  parochial  politics  and  open  to  the
widest  range  of policy  choices.  He  understands  the  technocratic  regime
as  a  political  process-at  once  liberal,  ecumenical,  and  modest-and
recruits  managers  who  will  use  it  in  the  right  spirit.  The  cosmopolitan
sets  himself against  the public  international  lawyer's  idealism  and nostal-
gic  romance  with  international  institutions  and  regulatory  regimes.
When  the  public  international  lawyer explains  the  evolutionary  urgen-
cy  of his  task,  the  cosmopolitan  can  only  smile  at his naivete.  But when
the  international  economic  lawyer  talks  about  the  end  of  the  regulatory
state,  the  obsolescence  of  national  regulation,  and  the  new  interdepen-
dence,  the  metropolitan  looks  up  from  his  work  and  agrees.  He  knows
this  all  already.  That  is  why he is  building  an  ark.